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Abstract
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic implications of customer capital accumulation at 
the fi rm level. We build an analytically tractable search model of fi rm dynamics in which fi rms 
compete for customers by posting pricing contracts in the product market. Cross-sectional 
price dispersion emerges in equilibrium because fi rms of different sizes and productivities use 
different pricing strategies to strike a balance between attracting new customers and exploiting 
incumbent ones. Using micro-pricing data from the U.S. retail sector, we calibrate the model 
to match moments from the cross-sectional distribution of sales and prices, and use our 
estimated model to explain sluggish aggregate dynamics and cross-sectional heterogeneity 
in the response of markups to aggregate shocks. We fi nd that there is incomplete price 
pass-through leading to procyclicality in the average markup, with smaller fi rms being more 
responsive to shocks than larger fi rms.
Keywords: customer capital, product market frictions, directed search, fi rm dynamics, 
dynamic contracts, price dispersion.
JEL classifi cation: D21, D83, E2, L11.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza las implicaciones macroeconómicas de la acumulación de «capital 
de clientes» a nivel de empresa. Presentamos un modelo dinámico de búsqueda en el 
que distintas empresas compiten por los consumidores mediante la oferta de contratos 
de precios en el mercado de bienes. En equilibrio, existe dispersión de precios porque 
empresas con distintos tamaños y niveles de productividad usan diferentes estrategias a la 
hora de balancear, por una parte, la atracción de nuevos clientes y, por otra, la obtención 
de mayores márgenes de sus consumidores actuales. Calibramos el modelo usando datos 
desagregados de precios del sector de comercio minorista en Estados Unidos, con el fi n de 
replicar la distribución de ventas y precios observados. A continuación, utilizamos el modelo 
estimado para analizar tanto la dinámica agregada como la heterogeneidad de la respuesta 
de los márgenes ante perturbaciones agregadas. Encontramos que la respuesta de los 
precios medios ante estas perturbaciones es incompleta, lo que lleva a un movimiento 
procíclico de los márgenes que es especialmente intenso entre las empresas pequeñas.
Palabras clave: capital de clientes, fricciones en el mercado de bienes, búsqueda dirigida, 
dinámicas empresariales, contratos dinámicos, dispersión de precios.
Códigos JEL: D21, D83, E2, L11.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that firms of different sizes and ages experience persistently
different growth paths along their life cycle. Newly established businesses typically start
out small relative to their more mature competitors, and this gap takes time to close (e.g.
Dunne et al. (1988), Caves (1998), Cabral and Mata (2003)). A large theoretical literature,
inspired by the seminal work of Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), has traditionally
attributed this evidence to a process of selection on the basis of productivity differences
among firms, and has analyzed how these may in turn shape firm and industry dynamics in
various meaningful ways.
Recently, this view has been challenged by a growing literature arguing that, because
empirical patterns of firm growth are usually based on revenue data (from which one can-
not disentangle output prices from quantities), the productivity-based interpretation of firm
heterogeneity may confound selection on technological productivity with selection on prof-
itability (e.g. Foster et al. (2008)). As more disaggregated data have become available over
subsequent years, new empirical evidence has shown that large cross-sectional differences in
revenue across firms remain after controlling for heterogeneity in productivity, suggesting
that differences in firm performance are stemming, to a great extent, from differences in
firms’ idiosyncratic demand. Further, the evidence suggests that this demand-side channel
of variation is persistent. Thus, firm investment in demand accumulation gives rise to differ-
ences in the life-cycle of businesses of similar productivities.1 Yet, little is known about the
aggregate implications of this micro-level phenomenon.
In this paper, we formalize these empirical findings by developing an equilibrium theory
of firm dynamics in product markets in which there is a meaningful role for a demand
accumulation process at the firm level. We interpret this process as the formation of a
customer base. In order to understand the role that this type of heterogeneity has for
macroeconomic dynamics, we enrich the model with aggregate and idiosyncratic supply and
demand shocks. We then use an estimated version of the model to explore the dynamics of
prices and markups in response to aggregate supply and demand shocks, with an emphasis
on how the responses are heterogeneous in the cross section of firms.
We propose a directed search model of a frictional product market in which a fixed mass of
ex-ante identical buyers must search for sellers of a certain homogenous product. Sellers differ
in their idiosyncratic productivity, and they post, and commit to, price contracts designed
to attract new potential customers. Within a productivity class, sellers are ex-post hetero-
geneous in the number of buyers that they sell the product to, since their pricing decisions
1Hottman et al. (2016) show, for U.S. retail, that most variation in the firm size distribution is attributable
to variation in demand components, while Foster et al. (2008, 2016) show, for U.S. commodity-like markets,
that the (technological) productivity advantage of entrants is small and it dissipates over the first few years
of operation, while idiosyncratic demand accounts for the bulk of the observed heterogeneity. Similar studies
for other countries include Carlsson et al. (2017) (Sweden), Pozzi and Schivardi (2016) (Italy), Hong (2017)
(France), Kaas and Kimasa (2018) (Germany), and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) (Colombia).
endogenously determine the rate at which demand accumulates. Outside of the market, idle
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sellers must pay a fixed entry (or “market penetration”) cost to reach their first customer.
Unmatched buyers, on the one hand, trade off the ex-post gains from matching to the ex-ante
probability of joining the customer base, as they internalize the endogenous probability that
each supplier’s size changes through the posted contract. On the other hand, new and old
customers remain loyal to the firm (even though there is no commitment on their part) be-
cause the promised continuation payoffs provide compensation for the costly opportunity of
searching for other suppliers. Hence, mutually valuable seller-customer relationships develop.
In equilibrium, sellers strike a balance between instantaneous revenues (via high prices)
and future market shares (via high promises). The way this trade-off is resolved depends
on the size of the seller’s customer base. In equilibrium, the sign of the correlation between
prices and size depends on the degree of frictions in the market.2 When costs to market
penetration are relatively high, small sellers optimally decide to promise high continuation
utilities in order to generate a high probability of quickly expanding their base and raise
enough resources to afford the entry cost. Because of product market congestion effects, the
customer capital accumulation process takes time. As firms mature, they lower their future
promises and raise the price as they increasingly prefer to exploit their customer base at the
expense of lowering the speed at which their market share accumulates. As a result, their
markups tend to increase as they grow in size, and the firm’s rate of growth slows down.
When entry costs are relatively low, however, the firm might instead be willing to lower its
prices as it grows, because it has a weaker preference for rapid growth at the early stages of
its life cycle. In either scenario, the endogenous customer acquisition process is counteracted
by per-customer separation and exit shocks, meaning that firms converge on average to a
stationary size. Therefore, on top of price dispersion, the model generates a well-defined and
right-skewed firm distribution.
To solve for the optimal pricing contract, we show that the model can be solved recur-
sively and that the policy that maximizes the seller’s expected value is equivalent to a joint
surplus maximization program. This equivalence is important because it reduces the dimen-
sionality of the state space, and even leads to some analytical tractability in the equilibrium
characterization. To obtain computational tractability, we exploit that the equilibrium is
block-recursive, a common property of models of directed search (e.g. Shi (2009), Menzio
and Shi (2010, 2011)). This property implies that, in order to evaluate payoffs, agents need
not keep track of the firm distribution across aggregate states and over time. Thus, the firm
distribution can be derived independently of the optimal contracting problem, and transi-
tional dynamics can be computed without the need for approximation methods. Further, we
show that a Markov perfect equilibrium is constrained-efficient. This allows us to interpret
2 In this sense, our model does not take a stance on the active empirical debate regarding the dynamics of
firm-level prices, where the literature has found mixed evidence. Foster et al. (2008, 2016) and Piveteau (2017)
claim that prices are increasing in the firm’s tenure in the market, while Berman et al. (2017) find that they
are slightly decreasing. Fitzgerald et al. (2017) find no dynamics of prices, and attribute growth in quantities
to advertising and marketing activities.
the model as a theory of efficient markups, in which sellers’ pricing decisions lead to a socially
optimal allocation of customers across product markets.
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In the second part of the paper, we quantify our model in order to study the aggregate
implications of firm-level customer accumulation, particularly regarding the cyclicality of ag-
gregate markups. To estimate the model, we use highly disaggregated product-level pricing
data for the U.S. retail sector (2001-2007), and calibrate the model to moments of the distri-
bution of relative prices and sales. Using the estimated model, we then analyze the response
of the economy to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.
In this exercise, we find both level and distributional effects. First, we show that the price
pass-through of aggregate temporary supply shocks (e.g. marginal costs) is incomplete: in
the wake of an adverse shock, firms choose to front-load their contracts by charging slightly
higher prices today and lowering the utility promised to their customers in the future. At the
heart of this result is the observation that, when hit by the shock, firms choose to trade-off
immediate losses to future market shares, which they achieve by inter-temporally transferring
the burden of shocks onto their buyers. Since the price level reacts less than one for one to
the increase in marginal costs, the markup is procyclical. In addition, we describe the effects
of aggregate demand shocks on firm pricing. Shocks that lower the marginal propensity
to consume by buyers generate a bust in demand and lower prices instantaneously. Since
the shock mean-reverts, firms depress their promises on impact but increase prices in the
transition. Overall, the markup response in this case is also procyclical. Thus, the model
provides a micro-founded explanation for procyclical price-cost markups in response to both
aggregate supply and demand shocks. This is important because not only there is mounting
evidence that markups are not countercyclical in the data (e.g. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)),
but also because this observation is famously at odds with most modern New Keynesian
models, particularly regarding demand shocks.
In our model, there are also important distributional changes during the transition after
shocks. Through a decrease in the continuation promise of firms, both negative supply
and negative demand shocks lead to a decrease in the number of new matches, and firms
temporarily shrink in size. This implies that the pass-through is less incomplete for larger
firms, as the markup response is stronger at the lower end of the size distribution. This is
because (i) along the extensive margin, there is a left-ward shift in the size distribution, and
(ii) along the intensive margin, a small firm’s pricing policy is relatively more sensitive to
size changes, for these firms are more eager to grow. Moreover, small firms also experience a
more persistent response, because during the transition the fraction of low-price, small-size
firms relatively increases and takes time to adjust back.
Our paper is related to a literature where customer capital is built into macroeconomic
models of firm pricing. Among early studies, Phelps and Winter (1970), Bils (1989), and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999), analyzed pricing behavior under customer retention
concerns.3 While the literature has traditionally resorted to reduced-form formulations for
3 In these papers, firms face an exogenous law of motion for the customer base. A number of papers have
3
further suggested reasons why customers may choose to lock into their suppliers in the first place, such as
switching costs (Klemperer (1987, 1995) and Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009)) or good-specific habits (Ravn
et al. (2006), Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), and Gilchrist et al. (2017)).
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customer capital formation, we offer a micro-foundation whereby it is the seller’s commitment
which gives rise to long-lasting relationships.
A contribution of our work is that we study the implications that customer-seller re-
lationships have on firm dynamics in the context of an equilibrium model with aggregate
shocks. In various contexts, previous studies have introduced a role for firm intangibles into
models of firm and industry dynamics.4 The effects of intangibles on macroeconomic aggre-
gates are well-understood, from labor wedges (Gourio and Rudanko (2014a)) and aggregate
productivity (McGrattan and Prescott (2014), McGrattan (2017)), to household behavior
(Hall (2008)) and the evolution of industries (Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012), Perla (2017)).
Within this literature, the paper most related to ours is Gourio and Rudanko (2014b). Dif-
ferent from their paper, we analyze firm growth and customer dynamics, and study pricing
behavior when price discrimination is not possible. Moreover, our model incorporates aggre-
gate shocks, and aims to explain the dynamics of the distribution of prices and markups.5
Kaas and Kimasa (2018) enrich the Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) framework to study the
joint dynamics of prices, output, and employment in the context of frictional labor markets.
Menzio and Trachter (2018) and Kaplan et al. (2018) show that price dispersion can emerge
from buyer heterogeneity in situations in which sellers can price-discriminate. In our model,
in contrast, buyers are identical and it is ex-post differences between firms which give rise
to different price levels. While a similar argument is made in Burdett and Coles (1997) and
Menzio (2007), these papers do not discuss the implications of customer capital accumulation
for the evolution of the firm size distribution or for aggregate dynamics. Luttmer (2006) and
Fishman and Rob (2003) discuss the implications for the firm size distribution, but in neither
of those papers is there a meaningful role for prices. Finally, Paciello et al. (2017) focus on
how idiosyncratic productivity levels affect the pricing decisions of firms with customer accu-
mulation concerns, whereas we aim to understand heterogeneities among sellers of the same
productivity, as motivated by the empirical evidence documented by Foster et al. (2008) and
others.6
Various papers have related empirically demand fundamentals to the determination of
prices at the firm level. Peters (2016) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) find a positive
correlation between output prices and plant size for Indonesian and Colombian firms, re-
spectively, while Carlsson et al. (2017) find, using Swedish microdata, that a substantial
4 Firm intangibles are a substantial share of firms’ expenditures, and in the U.S. as much as 7.7% of GDP is
devoted to marketing (e.g. Arkolakis (2010)).
5 In more recent work, Rudanko (2017) also studies the role of pricing for firm growth under different market
structures and pricing protocols. Unlike us, she does not focus on price and markup cyclicality in response to
aggregate shocks, or the distributional consequences of these shocks.
6Unlike Paciello et al. (2017), we do not need to assume that the growth rate of firms is independent of the
size of the customer base. That firm growth is inherently a function of the firm’s current size is a key aspect
and innovation of our theory.
component of output price variation remains unexplained after accounting for productivity
differences. DeLoecker and Eeckhout (2017) have found that smaller firms set lower markups
relative to competitors within their own industry, and DeLoecker (2011), DeLoecker and
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Warzynski (2012), and DeLoecker et al. (2016) perform similar analyses in the context of
exporting firms for different countries, concluding that markups are important contributors
to differences in revenue productivity.
Finally, our paper is related to search-and-matching models with large firms. We embed
directed search (e.g. Moen (1997)) into a model of firm dynamics in the spirit of Elsby and
Michaels (2013) or Kaas and Kircher (2015). Particularly, we combine two technical insights
from this literature. First, we exploit the property of block recursivity, which allows for a
tractable characterization of the firm distribution and its dynamics. Secondly, we make use of
dynamic long-term contracts (e.g. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), Schaal (2017)), which
reduce the dimensionality of the state space by allowing us to condense the full forward-
looking pricing problem into an amenable recursive form.
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supply that are unknown to the potential customer (e.g. the exact location of seller-price
pairs). Another interpretation is that sellers may face inventory or capacity constraints, and
are unable to simultaneously serve a large amount of buyers (as in Burdett et al. (2001)).
These demand considerations lead businesses to invest in reputation-building in order to
overcome those frictions.8
Buyers value the consumption of the good by the same fixed utility flow, v > 0. At any
instant in time, a buyer is said to be active if she is matched with a firm and is consuming
the good, and inactive if she is unmatched and searching for a seller at a cost, c. These
parameters possibly depend on the aggregate state of nature, ϕ. Since v and c relate directly
to buyers’ preferences, this state-dependence incorporates the possibility of aggregate and
exogenous demand fluctuations into the model.9 We also assume no buyer is ever allowed to
borrow against its future income.
Sellers belong to one of two groups: incumbent (or active) sellers, and potential entrant
(or inactive) sellers. At any given time t, a typical incumbent seller has a customer base
8 Informational frictions in the product market are the preferred interpretation of Faig and Jerez (2005),
Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), and Foster et al. (2016), among others.
9 The source of variation in shopping disutility can be thought of as reflecting the cyclical nature of household
shopping behavior, documented by Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2016) for the United States.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is continuous, infinite, and indexed by t ∈ R+. The aggregate state of the economy
is indexed by a time-varying random variable ϕ taking values in a discrete and finite support
Φ ≡ {ϕ < · · · < ϕ}, with cardinality kϕ ≡ |Φ| ≥ 2. The aggregate state is the source of
exogenous aggregate demand and/or supply fluctuations. We assume ϕ follows a homoge-
nous continuous-time Markov chain with generator matrix Λϕ ≡
[
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)], where λϕ(ϕ′|ϕ)
denotes the intensity rate of a ϕ-to-ϕ′ transition.7
The economy is populated by a mass-one continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived, ex-
ante identical buyers, and a continuum of risk-neutral firms (sometimes referred to as sellers).
The total mass of buyers is exogenous and normalized to unity, but the composition of buyers
across aggregate states and between types is endogenous. The total measure of firms is
endogenous. Agents discount future payoffs with a common and exogenous rate, r > 0.
There is a single homogenous, indivisible, and perishable good in the economy. Buyers
and sellers must participate in a search-and-matching market in order to engage in trade
because the product market is frictional: searchers cannot coordinate into finding a match
with certainty at any given instant. The product market frictions are meant to capture
congestion effects in product markets with customer anonymity. One interpretation is that
there exist informational asymmetries regarding product characteristics, or some aspects of
7 For all ϕ ∈ Φ, the following properties hold: λϕ(ϕ|ϕ) ≤ 0, λϕ(ϕ′|ϕ) ≥ 0 for any ϕ′ = ϕ, and
∑
ϕ′ λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ) =
0. These properties are definitional of continuous-time Markov processes (e.g. Norris (1997), Chapters 2 and
3). Additionally,
∑
ϕ′ λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ) < +∞, ∀ϕ (i.e. the economy always spends a non-zero measure of time in any
given state, when visited).
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of nt ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, 3, . . . } customers, which we subsequently call the size of the seller. Each
seller is also characterized by the realization of an idiosyncratic productivity level z, taking
values on a discrete and finite support Z ≡ {z < · · · < z} of cardinality kz ≡ |Z| ≥ 2.
Like the aggregate state, the idiosyncratic state follows a continuous-time Markov chain with
generator matrix Λz ≡
[
λz(z
′|z)], where λz(z′|z) denotes the transition rate from z to z′.10
The realization of the idiosyncratic state is observable and public information.
An incumbent seller’s output is constrained by the size of its customer base. Since the
good is indivisible, and because there is no benefit in leaving customers unserved, the number
of units sold by the seller equals the number of customers in the base, with each customer
consuming one unit. The seller also faces operating variable flow costs of C(n; z, ϕ), which
depend on the idiosyncratic state (n, z), as well as possibly the aggregate state ϕ. Further,
we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 For all (z, ϕ) ∈ Z × Φ:
(i) C is a continuous and increasing function of n, with C(n; z, ϕ) ≥ 0 and C(0; z, ϕ) = 0.
(ii) C(n; z, ϕ) is weakly convex in all n ∈ N.
Assumption 1 imposes mild regularity conditions on firm technology. It states that firm
profits are continuous in firm size. The curvature of C with respect to n determines the
degree of returns to scale. For now, we need not make an explicit assumption besides weak
convexity. Indeed, as we shall see, equilibrium prices depend non-linearly on sizes even when
10 The usual conditions apply. For all z ∈ Z: λz(z|z) ≤ 0; λz(z′|z) ≥ 0, ∀z′ = z;
∑
z′∈Z λϕ(z
′|z) = 0; and∑
z′ =z λϕ(z
′|z) < +∞.
marginal costs are constant in n. Similarly, the existence of a stationary distribution also
does not hinge on the curvature of C.
Besides serving their customers, incumbent sellers post prices in the product market.
Posting a price bears no explicit cost for an incumbent. Incumbent sellers exit the market
(and enter the pool of potential entrants) in either one of two ways: (i) if they go bankrupt
and lose all customers at once, at an exogenous rate δf > 0, or (ii) if they separate from their
last remaining customer (because the buyer leaves), at an exogenous rate δc > 0.
11 These
events are mutually independent, and orthogonal to the (z, ϕ)-shocks.
Like incumbent firms, inactive firms are posting prices in order to attract customers and
start operating in the product market. However, they must incur an entry cost κ > 0, which
possibly depends on the aggregate state of nature, ϕ. The fixed cost κ can be thought of as
a proxy for the costs of maintaining idle product technology or, more broadly, as a cost to
market penetration in the sense of Arkolakis (2010). Sellers who successfully attract their
first customer (and thus start operating with n = 1) draw an initial productivity level z0 ∈ Z
from some distribution πz, where πz(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z, and
∑
z∈Z πz(z) = 1. We assume free
entry of firms into the product market.
11 In Appendix D.1 we suggest ways to endogenize this customer separation rate.
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potentially lowering the average revenue from the incumbent base.
Product Markets
A sufficient statistic for each long-term pricing contract is the promised life-time value that
the contract delivers in expectation to the buyer at the point in time when the match is formed
and the contract is initiated. We generically denote this value by x. Let X = [x, x] ⊆ R+
be the set of feasible values, and let us assume that all sellers advertising the same value
x compete in all such contracts. Moreover, buyers cannot coordinate their decisions among
themselves. Up to the observable idiosyncratic state (n, z), sellers offering the same value
x are virtually indistinguishable to the buyer. Thus, x effectively indexes a product market
segment.
Each seller can simultaneously post, and each buyer can simultaneously search, in at most
one market segment. For each realization ϕ ∈ Φ of the aggregate state, let B(x;ϕ) ∈ [0, 1]
be the mass of buyers seeking to be matched under promised utility x, and S(x;ϕ) ≥ 0 be
the mass of sellers posting x. A market is said to be active if:
θ(x;ϕ) ≡ B(x;ϕ)
S(x;ϕ)
> 0
Pricing Contracts
At every instant, sellers announce price contracts in order to attract buyers. Buyers can
perfectly observe the posted contract and visit the seller posting it. For a customer-seller
match formed at time t, a price contract is defined as a sequence (pt+j : j ≥ 0), which
specifies the price level at each tenure j ≥ 0, conditional on no separation. Contracts are
complete and state-contingent. Thus, every element pt+j of the contract is contingent on the
history of aggregate and the firm’s idiosyncratic states up to date t+ j. Since all the relevant
states are public, then pt+j = p(n
t+j ; zt+j , ϕt+j), ∀j, t.
The contractual environment is as follows. On the demand side, we assume no commit-
ment to the contract, in that matched buyers can costlessly transition to inactivity if they
so desire (though in equilibrium this will not occur because of the subsequent additional
cost c of re-sampling firms). On the sellers’ side, we make two key assumptions. First, the
seller fully commits to the contract that is posted. This means that contracts with captive
customers cannot be revised by the firm for the duration of the match, and contracts have
to comply with the firm’s prior promises.12 Second, we assume anonymity among buyers,
in that the firm is unable to discriminate between new and old customers, and thus cannot
index the contract to the buyer’s identity.13 This implies that the firm must internalize that
any additional revenue from expanding the number of customers comes at the expense of
12An interpretation of this assumption is that firms have a reputational concern, so that reneging on previous
promises entails unaffordable costs for them. We discuss the role of this assumption in Section 3.
13 Intuitively, this is meant to capture the idea that, in largely populated markets where implicit relationships
develop, buyers are anonymous to the seller. In Appendix D.2 we discuss the implications of relaxing the no
discrimination assumption.
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the equilibrium policies depend solely on the firm’s vector of payoff-relevant states (n, x; s),
where henceforth we denote s ≡ (z, ϕ). (ii) We look for a symmetric equilibrium in the sense
that all firms within the same product market x choose to post the same contract. This is
a consequence of the assumption that there is competition within each market segment, and
the fact that the firm’s states are fully observable. (iii) Finally, we restrict our attention
to a stationary environment, in which policies are time-varying only insofar as they are
state-dependent. Thus, subsequently we drop time subscripts unless otherwise needed.14
Because a dynamic pricing contract is a time path and thus a large and potentially
complex object, we exploit the property of stationarity to propose the following recursive
formulation. We define a recursive dynamic contract for a firm in state (n, x; s) as:
ω ≡ {p,x′(n′; s′)}
The elements of a recursive contract ω are the following. First, the contract specifies the
price p that is to be charged to each one of the n incumbent customers of the firm. Second,
14We restrict ourselves to a Markov perfect equilibrium in order to obtain unique predictions for prices. How-
ever, in these type of models with dynamic contracts and commitment, real variables are uniquely determined
even when this restriction is not imposed. The reason is that sellers find it equivalent to change current prices
for future promised utilities.
where θ(x;ϕ) is the buyer-to-seller ratio in market segment x, also referred to as the
market tightness. Agents take the mapping θ : X × Φ → [0,+∞) as given when directing
their search toward specific offers. In a typical x ∈ X , a buyer obtains offer x at the
endogenous Poisson arrival rate μ
(
θ(x;ϕ)
) ≥ 0, while a seller successfully finds a buyer for
offer x at the Poisson arrival rate η
(
θ(x;ϕ)
) ≥ 0, where η(θ) = θμ(θ). Further, we assume:
Assumption 2 The meeting rates satisfy:
(i) η : R+ → R+ and μ : R+ → R+ are twice continuously differentiable;
(ii) η is increasing and concave; μ is decreasing and convex;
(iii) For some decreasing h : R+ → R+, define the composition f = η ◦ μ−1 ◦ h. Then, the
function f(x)(x̂− x) is concave for all x ∈ [0, x̂] and x̂ > 0;
(iv) η(0) = limθ↗+∞ μ(θ) = 0, and limθ↗+∞ η(θ) = limθ↘0 μ(θ) = +∞.
The first two restrictions guarantee that the problems of the buyer and the seller are
well-defined; assumption (iii) is a restriction on the composition η ◦ μ−1 guaranteeing that
the price-posting problem of the seller has a unique interior solution; finally, part (iv) is a
transversality condition on the meeting rates.
Recursive Formulation
We seek to solve for the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this economy. We narrow
attention to this class of equilibria in the following sense. (i) Markov-perfection means that
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for any x ∈ X . Equation (1) states that the inactive buyer searches in the product market
that promises the highest expected value, x̂(ϕ). The value of entering market x incorporates
the search cost c(ϕ) > 0, and the option value of matching with a firm within said market.
The last additive term in equation (2) incorporates the expected change in value due to a
change in the aggregate state.15
Since inactive buyers choose the best market to search in, all active markets must be
equally attractive ex-ante. Therefore:
∀(x, ϕ) ∈ X × Φ : uB(x;ϕ) ≤ UB(ϕ), with equality if, and only if, θ(x;ϕ) > 0
This says that a market either maximizes ex-ante payoffs for the inactive buyer, or it
remains unvisited. In equilibrium, a non-zero measure of markets is active, and we let
15Notation has been economized in two ways. First, since the value of inactivity is itself an equilibrium object,
we write θ(x;ϕ) when in fact we mean θ(x;ϕ,UB(ϕ)). Second, since market tightness is taken as given by the
agent, uB
(
x;ϕ
)
is in fact short for uB
(
x;ϕ, θ
)
, where θ maps from X ×Φ to R+. Similar concise notation will
be used throughout the paper.
the contract specifies the vector x′(n′; s′) ⊆ X of continuation payoffs that are promised by
the firm to each buyer on the next stage, i.e. under every possible size n′ ∈ {n− 1, n, n+ 1}
and exogenous state s′ ∈ {(z′, ϕ), (z, ϕ′)}. By stationarity, contracts are rewritten every time
the seller changes sizes or productivity, or if an aggregate shock hits, and they remain in place
otherwise (i.e. x′(n′; s′) = x when n′ = n and s′ = s).Notice, finally, that the contract is not
indexed to the aggregate distribution of agents across states. This is an implication of the
property of block recursivity, which we take as given and we discuss in some detail in Section
2.5.
2.2 Buyer’s Problem
Inactive Buyers
Let us now describe the value functions of each type of agent in the economy. Let UB(ϕ)
be the expected value of an inactive buyer in state ϕ ∈ Φ. The buyer enters the market
segment that offers the highest valuation, and therefore:
UB(ϕ) = max
x̂(ϕ)∈X
uB
(
x̂(ϕ);ϕ
)
(1)
where uB
(
x;ϕ
)
is the value of searching in market x, satisfying the HJB equation:
ruB
(
x;ϕ
)
= −c(ϕ) + μ(θ(x;ϕ))(x− uB(x;ϕ))+ ∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
uB
(
x;ϕ′
)− uB(x;ϕ)) (2)
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X ∗(ϕ) ≡ {x ∈ X : θ(x;ϕ) > 0} ⊆ X be the equilibrium set of markets in state ϕ ∈ Φ. Hence,
for any given aggregate state ϕ ∈ Φ, we have:
μ
(
θ(x;ϕ)
)(
x− UB(ϕ)
)
= ΓB(ϕ) (3)
for all x ∈ X ∗(ϕ), where we have defined the opportunity cost of matching for the buyer
in equilibrium market x as:
ΓB(ϕ) ≡ c(ϕ) + rUB(ϕ)−
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
UB(ϕ′)− UB(ϕ)
)
(4)
Note that, for each ϕ ∈ Φ, θ(x;ϕ) is an increasing function of x ∈ X . This result is in-
tuitive: more ex-post profitable offers attract a larger mass of buyers per seller, while sellers
offering less favorable contracts to the buyer can expect to find a match sooner. In equilib-
rium, firms design contracts for which a low meeting rate for buyers is compensated with
higher expected promised values. Further, the buyer-to-seller ratio is increasing in UB(ϕ):
when the inactive buyers’ outside option is higher, contracts must offer more attractive deals
in order to compensate for the opportunity cost of matching.
Active Buyers
Consider now a buyer who is currently consuming the homogeneous good from a firm
of size n and idiosyncratic productivity z, under contract ω =
{
p,x′(n′; s′)
}
. The contract
specifies the current price and the new continuation promises to be delivered by the seller
under each new possible state. The value for the buyer is given by the HJB equation:
rV B(n,ω; s) = v(ϕ)− p+ (δf + δc)
(
UB(ϕ)− V B(n,ω; s)
)
(5)
+ (n− 1)δc
(
x′(n− 1; s)− V B(n,ω; s)
)
+ η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; s);ϕ
))(
x′(n+ 1; s)− V B(n,ω; s)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
x′(n; z′, ϕ)− V B(n,ω; s)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
x′(n; z, ϕ′)− V B(n,ω; s)
)
The right side of equation (5) has different additive terms. In the first line, the first
term, v − p, shows flow surplus for the agreed-upon price, and the second term states the
possibility of separation, due to either the destruction of the firm or the destruction of the
match. The second line includes the event that a customer (other than the one in question)
separates, in which case the firm becomes size n − 1 and changes the promised value to all
those customers that remain captive. The third line is the expected change in value due
to the firm successfully attracting a customer, in which case the seller becomes size n + 1
and implements value x′(n+ 1; s) ∈ ω. The likelihood of the event depends upon how tight
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where V S0 (ϕ) denotes the value of having no customers (which we derive below).
16 The
term
[
pn−C(n; s)] is the seller’s flow profits, composed of revenue from selling to n customers,
net of operating costs. The next term on the first line is the expected change in value if the
seller goes bankrupt, in which case she instantly loses all customers and enters the pool
of potential entrants. The third additive term includes the probability that one of the n
customers separates, in which case the seller delivers the promised value x′(n − 1; s). The
second line shows that, by posting a new offer x′(n+1; s), the seller might attract the (n+1)-
th buyer. When making a new offer, the seller understands the sorting behavior of buyers
across states for different promised values through the equilibrium θ schedule. Finally, the
value of the firm could change due to an exogenous state transition.17
When choosing ω, the seller is constrained by:
V B(n,ω; s) ≥ x (7)
16 The object Ω ≡ R × [x, x]k denotes the set of admissible contracts, where k ≡ 3kzkϕ − 1 is the number of
new promises made. For n = 1, we note that x′(n− 1; s) = ∅.
17 Figure B.1 in the Appendix provides a graphical depiction of all possible seller transitions.
market x′(n+ 1; s) is. Finally, the last two lines of equation (5) include the change in value
due to an exogenous shock, whether idiosyncratic or aggregate.
Equation (5) shows that, when the buyer is captive and the seller is subject to size or
productivity changes, the customer must internalize how the seller will optimally redesign
the contract under the new state. This meaningful forward-looking aspect of demand arises
because the seller is committing to its customers.
2.3 Seller’s Problem
Incumbent Sellers
Consider a seller with idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ Z who is serving n ∈ N customers
under the promised value of x ∈ X . The seller must choose a new contract ω = {p,x′(n′; s′)}
to maximize the life-time value:
rV S(n, x; s) = max
ω∈Ω
{
pn− C(n; s) + δf
(
V S0 (ϕ)− V S(n, x; s)
)
(6)
+ nδc
(
V S
(
n− 1, x′(n− 1; s); s)− V S(n, x; s))
+ η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; s);ϕ
))(
V S
(
n+ 1, x′(n+ 1; s); s
)− V S(n, x; s))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
V S
(
n, x′(n; z′, ϕ); z′, ϕ
)− V S(n, x; s))
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Equation (7) is a promise-keeping (PK) constraint guaranteeing that, with its choice of
the contract, the seller honors the promises that were made in the past: the value that each
buyer of the firm obtains under the contract must be weakly greater than the value x that
was promised to her.
Potential Entrants
Inactive firms have no customers (i.e. n = 0) and, unlike incumbents, they must incur a
flow set-up cost κ > 0 in order to post a contract. Prior to selling the good, they must also
draw an initial productivity level z0 from the πz distribution. For each possible realization
z0 ∈ Z, their proposed contract is a promised value to their first customer.
Formally, the ex-ante value of the potential entrant in aggregate state ϕ solves:
rV S0 (ϕ) = −κ(ϕ) +
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)v
S
0 (z0, ϕ) +
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
V S0 (ϕ
′)− V S0 (ϕ)
)
(8)
This value is composed of the set-up flow cost κ (first additive term), the expected value
of posting a contract under productivity draw z0 (second term), and the expected change in
the ex-ante value of entry for a change in the aggregate state (third term). We have defined
the expected value of entry under a draw z0 by:
vS0 (z0, ϕ) ≡ max
x′∈X
η
(
θ(x′;ϕ)
)(
V S
(
1, x′; z0, ϕ
)− V S0 (ϕ)) (9)
Once again, the firm understands how inactive buyers sort across markets, in that the
θ(·;ϕ) schedule is taken as given. There is no PK constraint in this case as the firm does not
yet have any customers.
We assume free entry into the product market for the first customer. Since the total
mass of sellers adjusts freely, firms will flood into the economy insofar as the expected value
of posting a contract exceeds the set-up cost κ(ϕ) > 0. Therefore, in an equilibrium with
positive entry in all aggregate states, it must be the case that:
∀ϕ ∈ Φ : V S0 (ϕ) = 0
The free-entry condition thus pins down the average market tightness among single-
customer firms in the cross-section of initial productivities.
2.4 Optimal Contract
In this section, we derive and describe the properties of the optimal contract for a typ-
ical firm. Our main result is that, since contracts are complete, and sellers and buyers
can engage in revenue-neutral transfers schemes, the seller’s and the joint surplus problems
are equivalent. As we shall see, this simplifies the state space and renders the equilibrium
computationally tractable.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1838
Joint Surplus Problem
Consider a typical firm whose state vector is (n, x; s). As seen in the last section, the
optimal contract ω =
{
p,x′(n′; s′)
}
can be obtained as the solution to the problem of the
seller, described in (6). A standard monotonicity argument reveals that sellers will offer the
lowest values to their buyers such that the seller’s promises are still honored, and so the PK
constraint (7) will hold with equality. To economize on notation, for the remainder of the
paper we write x (a predetermined state variable) in place of V B(n,ω; s).
Next, define the joint surplus in a typical state (n, x; s) as the sum of the seller’s expected
value from the match, V S(n, x; s), and the aggregate expected value for all the n customers
of the firm:
+ η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; s);ϕ
))(
W
(
n+ 1, x′(n+ 1; s); s
)−W (n, x; s))
+ nδc
(
W
(
n− 1, x′(n− 1; s); s)−W (n, x; s))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
W
(
n, x(z′, ϕ); z′, ϕ
)−W (n, x; s))
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
W
(
n, x(z, ϕ′); z, ϕ′
)−W (n, x; s))}
Intuitively, equation (10) represents the joint surplus as the present discounted value of
the buyers’ total surplus, net of the seller’s total costs. On the first line, the term n
(
v+(δf +
δc)U
B
)
represents the aggregate flow surplus for all the n customers of the firm, composed
of the sum of the per-customer utility from consumption and the expected per-customer
gains from separation. The second line collects (inside the parenthesis) the total costs of the
match for the seller, equal to total operating costs (first term) plus the expected cost of the
new contract. The latter is composed of the product of the promised value, x′(n + 1), and
the endogenous probability of attraction, η
(
θ(x′(n+ 1))
)
. The remaining terms in equation
(10) take into account the usual transitions (i.e. separation, growth, and exogenous shocks).
Then, we can show:
Proposition 1 (Joint Surplus Problem) The following properties hold:
i. The firm’s and the joint surplus problems are equivalent. In particular:
(a) If some ω =
{
p,x′(n′; s′)
}
solves (6)-(7), then x′(n′; s′) is a solution to (10).
(r + δf )W (n, x; s) = max
x′(n′;s′)
{
n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕ)
)
(10)
−
(
C(n; s) + η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; s);ϕ
))
x′(n+ 1; s)
)
W (n, x; s) ≡ V S(n, x; s) + nx
In Appendix C.1 we show that the joint surplus can be written as follows:
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(b) Conversely, for every vector x′(n′; s′) that solves (10), there exists a unique p for
which
{
p,x′(n′; s′)
}
is a solution to (6)-(7).
ii. The joint surplus function W (n, x; s) is constant in x.
For the proof, see Appendix C.1. Part i. of Proposition 1 establishes that the contract
that maximizes the seller’s profits can be found by solving an alternative problem, given by
(10). In this problem, the contract maximizes the profits of all the parties involved in a
utilitarian fashion, provided that the seller extracts rents from each buyer up to the limit
established by promise-keeping. Since the contract space is complete (that is, it specifies
continuation promises for each and every possible future state), and both agents have linear
preferences, there always exists a menu of price and promised utility that, for any future
state, redistributes rents among the seller and its customers in a payoff-maximizing way.
Part ii. of the proposition follows immediately from this logic, and clarifies why problem
(10) is much simpler to solve than the firm’s problem. Since price and continuation promises
map one-for-one, the maximized surplus is invariant to the rent-sharing components of the
contract. Conveniently, this means that the problem can be split in two stages. In Stage 1, the
firm sets the vector of continuation promises x′(n′; s′) that maximizes the size of the surplus
under every possible combination of future states. In Stage 2, the price level implements
such an allocation, thus splitting and distributing rents among all n+ 1 agents involved, by
ensuring that PK binds in every single state. Further, the surplus is also constant in the
firm’s outstanding promise, x, for this is a predetermined state that was chosen optimally
previously by the firm. Thus, given s, there exists a sequence {Wn(s)}+∞n=1 such that:
∀(n, x) ∈ N×X : Wn(s) = W (n, x; s)
As a result, the policy that solves problem (10) is not a function of x, and neither is the
optimal price level, simplifying the characterization of the equilibrium.18
Equilibrium Characterization
By ex-ante indifference, the option value of matching for the buyer is constant across
markets and given by ΓB(ϕ) (equation (4)). Therefore, the tightness of market x is:
θ(x;ϕ) = μ−1
(
ΓB(ϕ)
x− UB(ϕ)
)
(11)
By Assumption 2.i and continuity of θ on x, equation (10) describes the maximization of
a continuous function over a compact support, so there exist promises
{
x′(n + 1; s), x′(n −
1; s),x′(n; s′)
}
and a price level p(n; s) that solve the joint surplus problem. Once again, note
that we index these policies by n, but not x.
18 Schaal (2017) uses similar insights for tractability in a firm-dynamics search model of the labor market.
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Stage 1. Continuation promises We begin with the choice of x′(n + 1; s). First, by
equation (11) and differentiability of η, the following first-order condition is sufficient:19
∂η
(
θ(x′;ϕ)
)
∂x′
(
Wn+1(s)−Wn(s)
)
=
∂η
(
θ(x′;ϕ)
)
∂x′
x′ + η
(
θ(x′;ϕ)
)
(12)
Let x′(n+1; s) denote the solution to equation (12). Intuitively, the optimal continuation
value x′(n + 1; s) equates the expected marginal benefit of upgrading the size of the firm
by one customer (left-hand side), to the expected marginal costs of such a transition (right-
hand side). On the left-hand side: an increase by one util in the promised value increases
the joint surplus by the amount (Wn+1 −Wn) > 0 in case the seller makes a size transition.
These gains must then be weighted by the marginal effect of the raised promised value on
the likelihood that the firm meets a new customer. On the right-hand side: for every util
spent on the continuation promise, the seller incurs in two associated costs. First, the direct
cost of delivering the new value to the additional customer, weighted by the change in the
meeting rate. Second, the decrease in the price level of all currently captive buyers of the
firms, by η
(
θ(x′(n+ 1; s);ϕ)
)
utils, which is required by promise-keeping.
19 Sufficiency obtains because the second-order condition follows from Assumption 2.iii when, in the language
of that Assumption, we pick h(x) ≡ ΓB
x−UB and x̂ ≡ Wn+1 −Wn.
By symmetry, we have that for any two sellers of sizes n ≥ 2 and m, respectively, then
x′(n− 1; s) = x′(m+ 1; s) if m = n− 2. In words, the optimal downsizing choice for a size-n
seller (left side of the equality) must be consistent with the optimal upsizing choice for a
firm of size n − 2 (right side). Similarly, when transitioning to another state, equation (11)
and symmetry require that x′(n; s′) = x′(m + 1; s′) for any two sellers of sizes n ≥ 2 and
m = n− 1. Finally, for n = 1, the free entry condition must be satisfied, implying:
κ(ϕ) =
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)η
(
θ
(
x′(1; z0, ϕ);ϕ
))(
W1(z0, ϕ)− x′(1; z0, ϕ)
)
(13)
Summing up, the set of equilibrium markets is X ∗ ≡ {x′(n; z, ϕ) : (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N×Z ×Φ},
where x′(n; z, ϕ) solves (12) for each n ≥ 2, and (13) for n = 1.
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Market tightness levels, θn(z, ϕ) ≡ θ
(
x′(n; z, ϕ);ϕ
)
, are found via equation (11). Since
θ(x;ϕ) is an increasing and continuous function of x, θn inherits the size-dependence of x
′.
In turn, θn determines firm growth rates in equilibrium. Formally, the law of motion of a
type-z seller with nt customers at time t is given by:
nt+Δ − nt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 w/prob. η
(
θnt+1(z, ϕ)
)
Δ+ o(Δ)
−1 w/prob. ntδcΔ+ o(Δ)
−nt w/prob. δfΔ+ o(Δ)
0 else
(14)
for a small time lapse Δ > 0, where limΔ↘0
o(Δ)
Δ = 0. For instance, when x
′ is decreasing
in n, smaller firms attract more buyers per unit of time by offering higher ex-post values,
so the buyer-to-seller ratio is higher in those markets, and these firms grow relatively faster
compared to other firms. Figure 1 depicts the different markets in equilibrium for this case.
All equilibrium markets are distributed on the θ schedule defined by buyer’s ex-ante revenue
equalization. To grow, the seller makes a state-contingent promise that is strictly below the
current valuation of her buyers (depicted on the horizontal axis), but always above UB to
keep them from separating. In equilibrium, the resulting collection of markets makes inactive
buyers indifferent.
Stage 2. Prices Finally, the equilibrium price can be backed out of the PK constraint,
which is binding. First, we replace V B(n,ω; z, ϕ) = x′(n; z, ϕ) and the components of ω in
equation (5). Then, solving for p in the resulting equation, we obtain:
pn(z, ϕ) = v(ϕ)− rx′(n; z, ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Baseline component
+ δf
(
UB(ϕ)− x′(n; z, ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit component
+ η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)(
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ)− x′(n; z, ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Growth component
+ nδc
(
UB(ϕ) + (n− 1)x′(n− 1; z, ϕ)
n
− x′(n; z, ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Separation component
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
x′(n; z′, ϕ)− x′(n; z, ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic-shock component
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
x′(n; z, ϕ′)− x′(n; z, ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate-shock component
(15)
20 Indeed, in that case we would have p = v − rx, that is x = ∫ +∞
0
e−rt(v − p)dt, the PDV of perpetually
obtaining the fixed surplus (v − p).
The optimal price level can be decomposed into the following additive parts. The first one
is the price level that would prevail if, in the absence of any exogenous shock, each customer
were to stay matched forever with its seller and size did not change going forward. We call
this term the baseline price level.20 The remaining terms in (15) introduce the necessary
adjustments for possible changes in firm states.
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To provide intuition, consider again the parametrization under which x′ decreases in n
(as in Figure 1). Over and above the baseline price, the firm first offers a price reduction
of δf
(
UB − x′(n)) ≤ 0 to compensate the customer for the expected loss in value in the
event that the firm exits the market. We label this the exit component. Second, the term
η(θn+1)
(
x′(n + 1) − x′(n)) ≤ 0 is a compensation for the eventuality that the firm grows.
This compensation is thus labeled the growth component. Third, the firm adjusts the price
for the event of customer separation: a reduction in size lowers the seller’s value and has a
pecuniary externality on all those customers that remain matched, so the price must again be
adjusted to remain compatible with the seller’s commitment. We call this term the separation
component. If a separation occurs, then the separating customer obtains UB, whereas the
remaining n − 1 customers each obtain x′(n − 1). This amounts to an average value of
UB+(n−1)x′(n−1)
n per customer. Finally, the last two terms in equation (15) adjust the price
level for expected changes in the exogenous states.
21Kaas and Kircher (2015) exploit similar insights to obtain tractability. An alternative approach would be
to dispense of the indifference condition among inactive buyers, and assume instead free entry of firms across
all markets (e.g. Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011) and Schaal (2017)).
In Section 3 we will discuss the different price effects that may be present in equilibrium
and provide some intuition for the direction of the dependence on size.
2.5 Distribution Dynamics
To close the equilibrium, we need to describe the dynamics of the distribution of agents.
The equilibrium of the economy described above features heterogeneous agents making
forward-looking decisions and sorting into distinct product markets in the presence of both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The distribution of agents across markets in turn de-
pends on the aggregation of such decisions. Yet, our equilibrium characterization has been
silent on the composition of buyers and sellers across market segments, or the evolution of
this distribution. This is because the equilibrium is block-recursive.
In our model, block recursivity arises from two key ingredients. First, we assume that
search is directed, and thus sellers’ offers are not contingent on the identity, and in particular
the outside option, of the buyer. As a result, market tightness, which embodies agents’
distributions, serves as a sufficient statistic for both sellers and buyers when making decisions,
and allows them to not having to forecast the evolution of aggregates over future states of
the economy. Second, the ex-ante revenue-equalization condition across all markets among
inactive buyers (equation (3)) implies that the equilibrium tightness on each market adjusts
to be consistent with agents’ beliefs.21 Because market tightness is a sufficient statistic
to evaluate payoffs in this economy, the model allows for the description of distribution
transitional dynamics by means of flow equations (below). This makes our environment
particularly apt to study aggregate product market dynamics.
Let Sn,t(z) ≥ 0 be the total measure of firms of size n with idiosyncratic productivity
z ∈ Z at time t ≥ 0. Recall that all such firms are seeking new customers in market
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x′(n + 1; z, ϕ). Let BIn+1(z, ϕ) be the measure of (inactive and searching) buyers within
market x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ). Then, market tightness must adjust so that:
BIn+1,t(z, ϕ) = θn+1(z, ϕ)Sn,t(z) (16)
at every t ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N. Using that η(θ) = θμ(θ), equation (16) can alternatively be
written as μ
(
θn(z, ϕ)
)
BIn,t(z, ϕ) = η
(
θn(z, ϕ)
)
Sn−1,t(z), stating that the measure of inactive
buyers who become customers of a (n, z)-type firm is equal to the measure of sellers of
productivity z and size n− 1 who acquire their n-th customer.
Similarly, let BAn,t(z) be the measure of customers that are matched with firms of type
(n, z) at time t. By construction, we have:
BAn,t(z) = nSn,t(z) (17)
at any t ≥ 0. The measures of inactive and active buyers must add up to the total mass
of buyers in the economy at all times, and thus:
∀ϕ ∈ Φ, ∀t ≥ 0 :
+∞∑
n=1
∑
z∈Z
BAn,t(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=BAt
+
+∞∑
n=1
∑
z∈Z
BIn,t(z, ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=BIt
= 1 (18)
This equation establishes an aggregate feasibility constraint: the unit mass of buyers must
be either matched with a firm and consuming, or looking for a match.
Market tightness jumps instantaneously in response to an aggregate shock.22 This is
because the mass of inactive buyers adjusts immediately to guarantee that the indifference
condition among unmatched buyers (equation (3)) is met in all states of nature. However,
by block recursivity, tightness remains constant along each aggregate state. The mass of po-
tential entrants, denoted S0,t(ϕ), jumps following a ϕ-shock, and otherwise evolves smoothly
due to sellers flowing in and out of inactivity in the transition. The distribution of firms,
{Sn,t(z)}, is slow-moving and continuous in time. Because of this slow adjustment, the model
thus feature sluggish aggregate dynamics.
Formally, the flows into and out of size n = 1 and some z ∈ Z are:
∂tS1,t(z) = πz(z)η
(
θ1(z, ϕ)
)
S0,t(ϕ) + 2δcS2,t(z) +
∑
z˜ 
=z
λz(z|z˜)S1,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + δc + η
(
θ2(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z˜ 
=z
λz(z˜|z)
)
S1,t(z) (19)
where ∂t is the partial derivative operator with respect to time. Inflows (first line) are
given by successful entrants drawing productivity z upon entry, and by the share of incum-
22Our notation convention is the following: (i) explicit dependence on ϕ denotes that a variable jumps with
ϕ; (ii) a subscript t denotes time-dependence for fixed ϕ.
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bents that are either losing a customer, or transitioning into z from some z˜ = z. Outflows
(second line) are given by firms that either die, lose their only customer, gain a second cus-
tomer, or transition to a distinct productivity state, z˜ = z. The aggregate state ϕ enters the
law of motion implicitly through its influence on the jump dynamics of S0 and θ1. For n ≥ 2:
∂tSn,t(z) = η
(
θn(z, ϕ)
)
Sn−1,t(z) + (n+ 1)δcSn+1,t(z) +
∑
z˜ 
=z
λz(z|z˜)Sn,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + nδc + η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z˜ 
=z
λz(z˜|z)
)
Sn,t(z) (20)
The interpretation of equation (20) is almost identical to that of the previous equation.
23 In general, an analytical solution for the stationary distribution does not exist unless (i) we place an upper-
bound on the space of seller sizes, or (ii) we shut down (z, ϕ)-shocks and assume δf = 0. For (i), see Proposition
4. For (ii), see Appendix F.2.
Finally, the measure of potential entrants, S0,t(ϕ), obeys the following ODE:
∂tS0,t(ϕ) = δfSt + δc
∑
z∈Z
S1,t(z)−
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)η
(
θ1,t(z0, ϕ)
)
S0,t(ϕ) (21)
where St ≡
∑+∞
n=1
∑
z∈Z Sn,t(z) is the total measure of incumbent firms (i.e. firms with
one or more customers). The usual interpretation applies, with the particularity that entering
firms must now draw an initial productivity level from the πz distribution.
Equations (19)-(21) offer a full characterization of the model’s dynamics. We may now
equate flows in and out of every possible state to obtain the stationary distribution of firms:
∂tSn,t(z) = 0, ∀n, z.23 As the last step, we must derive the aggregate measures of agents in
the stationary solution. This is shown in Appendix F.1.
2.6 Equilibrium Definition and Efficiency
We are now ready to define an equilibrium:
Definition 1 A Recursive Equilibrium is, for each aggregate state ϕ ∈ Φ and time t ∈ R+,
a set of value functions V S(·, ϕ) : N × X × Z → R and V B(·, ϕ) : N × Ω × Z → R; a value
of inactivity UB(ϕ) ∈ R; joint surplus and prices {Wn(z, ϕ), pn(z, ϕ) : (n, z) ∈ N× Z}, and
continuation promises
{
x′(n+1; z, ϕ), x′(n−1; z, ϕ), {x′(n; z′, ϕ) : z′ ∈ Z}, {x′(n; z, ϕ′) : ϕ′ ∈
Φ}}; a decision rule x̂(ϕ) for inactive buyers; a market tightness function θ(·, ϕ) : X → R+;
aggregate measures of agents {S0,t(ϕ),St, BAt , BIt }; and a distribution of sellers and buyers:{
Sn,t(z), B
A
n,t(z), B
I
n,t(z, ϕ) : (n, z) ∈ N×Z
}
; such that: [i] the value functions solve (5) and
(6), UB(ϕ) satisfies the free-entry condition (13), and the joint surplus Wn(z, ϕ) solves (10);
[ii] price and continuation promises satisfy (15) and (12), respectively; [iii] x̂(ϕ) solves the
inactive buyer’s problem, (1)-(2); [iv] market tightness θ(x;ϕ) is consistent with the sorting
behavior of inactive buyers, (3); and [v] aggregates and the distribution of agents satisfy the
flow equations in Section 2.5.
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Proposition 2 below states that, given the search frictions, a Recursive Equilibrium is
efficient. In our environment, the planner chooses distributions of buyers and sellers, as well
as market tightness levels, in order to solve:
max E0
{∫ +∞
0
e−rtWt(ϕt)dt
}
(22)
where welfare is:
Wt(ϕt) ≡ −κ(ϕt)S0,t +
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
(
v(ϕt)B
A
nt,t(zt)− C(nt; zt, ϕt)Snt,t(zt)− c(ϕt)BInt,t(zt)
)
subject to the cross-sectional and dynamic properties of the distribution of agents described
in Section 2.5. Aggregate welfare in this economy equals the present discounted sum of
consumption gains by active buyers, net of search costs by inactive buyers, and production
and entry costs by firms. Using this definition, we then establish:
Proposition 2 (Efficiency) A Recursive Equilibrium is efficient.
For the proof, see Appendix C.2. This result implies that, given the search frictions,
our model features efficient firm dynamics and efficient pricing behavior. In particular,
markup dispersion is necessary to optimally distribute trade gains among buyers and sellers,
as prices in our environment serve to efficiently direct buyer search toward specific product
markets. The result is in contrast to models explaining dispersion in firm-level revenue
through (inefficient) resource misallocation (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). While we do
not rule out other interpretations, our setting demonstrates that this type of dispersion may
also be generated through efficient pricing in the context of a frictional market.
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3 Model Discussion
This section presents the qualitative properties of the equilibrium, with an emphasis on
how product market frictions lead firms of different sizes to set different combinations of
price and promised utilities, and to experience different subsequent growth paths. Then, we
comment on the key assumptions and describe the role that they play in the model.
3.1 Qualitative Features
We begin with a useful result. Under a standard matching function, the model admits a
partial analytical representation in the following sense: for each given value of inactivity UB,
the equilibrium joint surplus Wn+1 can be found as the solution of a second-order difference
equation, i.e. as a function of n, Wn, Wn−1, and parameters. Assume:
μ(θ) = θγ−1
with η(θ) = θμ(θ), where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the matching elasticity.24 Then:
Proposition 3 (Solution of the Joint Surplus) For each (z, ϕ) ∈ Z × Φ:
(a) The joint surplus Wn(z, ϕ) solves a second-order difference equation in n:
Wn+1(z, ϕ) = Wn(z, ϕ) + U
B(ϕ) +
(
ΓB(ϕ)
γ
)γ (
ΓSn(z, ϕ)
1− γ
)1−γ
(23)
where ΓSn(z, ϕ) is a function of n, Wn, Wn−1, and parameters (see Appendix).
24 This arises from a Cobb-Doublas matching function, M(B,S) = BγS1−γ . However, Proposition 3 holds for
the more general CES case μ(θ) = (1 + θξ)−1/ξ, of which Cobb-Douglas is a special case when ξ → 0.
25 For the remainder of this section, we suppress state dependence to alleviate notation.
(b) Promised utility equals: xn+1(z, ϕ) = γ
(
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)
)
+ (1− γ)UB(ϕ).
For the proof, see Appendix C.3. Proposition 3 shows that, in spite of the rich dynamics
of the model, the joint surplus can be expressed in a very tractable form. The formulae have
intuitive interpretations. First, in the Appendix we show that:25
ΓB = μ(θn+1)
(
xn+1 − UB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-post
buyer net gains
from new match
and ΓSn = η(θn+1)
(
Wn+1 −Wn − xn+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-post
seller net gains
from new match
For each equation, the right hand-side of the equality gives the product of the ex-post net
gain from a new match, times the probability that a match occurs from the perspective of
buyer and seller, respectively. Thus, in equilibrium ΓB and ΓSn are the ex-ante net gains from
matching for the buyer and the seller, respectively. ΓB is constant in n (and z) because of
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ex-ante buyer indifference (equation (3)). ΓSn depends on the seller’s size: the seller extracts
the total gain in joint surplus (Wn+1 −Wn) > 0, net of the value xn+1 that was promised to
the new consumer.
Therefore, part (a) of Proposition 3 says that the equilibrium marginal net gain in joint
surplus from each new match (i.e. Wn+1−Wn−UB) is a convex combination of the ex-ante
net match gains that accrue to the new customer and her seller. Part (b) states that the
matching elasticity parameter γ governs how the surplus is shared ex-post between the seller
and the new customer. The customer’s ex-post net gains are given by:
xn+1 − UB = γ
(
Wn+1 −Wn − UB
)
showing that a fraction γ of the total gains in joint surplus are absorbed by the new
incoming buyer. Interestingly, the ex-post gains for the seller must incorporate rents shared
with the new buyer, as well as all those shared with the pre-existing buyers:
V Sn+1 − V Sn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller’s overall ex-post
net gain from growing
= (1− γ)
(
Wn+1 −Wn − UB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[A] Surplus extracted
directly out of new customer
+ n
(
xn − xn+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[B] Surplus transferred between
seller and pre-existing customers
(24)
In words, after a n → (n + 1) transition, the seller absorbs a share (1 − γ) of the total
net gain in joint surplus from the new customer (term [A]). In addition, some surplus is
transferred between the seller and the n pre-existing customers (term [B]).
For example, when buyer valuation is decreasing in n (i.e. xn > xn+1), term [B] is a
positive transfer from all n pre-existing customers to their seller. Figure 2 shows, in this
case, how net gains for buyers and sellers change with size (from both ex-ante and ex-post
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Figure 2: Ex-ante and ex-post gains for the new buyer and the seller (left and middle
panels), and decomposition of seller gains, across seller size n (right panel), for a numerical
example. The red lines are ΓB and ΓSn . The black lines are (xn+1 − UB) and (Wn+1 −
Wn − xn+1). The right panel is the decomposition in equation (24).
perspectives). We see in the right-most panel that, as the seller grows, she increasingly prefers
to extract rents from the current customer base (term [B] increases), and is less concerned
with extracting surplus from the new consumer (term [A] decreases).
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Figure 3: Change in joint surplus, net customer ex-post gains, market tightness, and firm
growth, as a function of size, for the case with constant marginal cost (i.e. C(n) ∝ n). Firm
growth (equation (14)) has been decomposed between the rate of customer attraction (solid
line) and that of customer attrition (dashed line). The intersection of these two lines marks
the stationary size.
Finally, we describe the relationship between promises (xn) and sizes (n) in equilibrium.
Figure 3 shows a numerical example in which promised utilities are strictly decreasing with
size. This will be the case in our estimated model. The reason for the relation is that the
seller needs to raise resources from future customers quickly in order to overcome the initial
market penetration cost, κ. At the same time, she must entice customers to remain matched.
Thus, she lowers the promise as more customers join, but always so that xn > U
B, ∀n. As a
result, market tightness is higher for smaller firms, who experience faster growth on average.
On the other hand, when the costs to market penetration are sufficiently low, the need to
raise resources from the future is weaker. In this case, the profile of continuation values
increases, and price will rise as the seller grows (Figure B.2 in Appendix B). In sum, the
model can generate different price-size correlations, depending on parameters.
3.2 Discussion of the Model’s Main Assumptions
Our model is somewhat stylized, particularly on the contractual environment. Here, we
comment on the three most relevant assumptions:
Endogenous Separations We have assumed that customers cannot bypass the costly
inactive state when they separate (either voluntarily or due to a shock) from their seller.
Allowing for endogenous seller-to-seller transitions would incorporate an additional dimen-
sion into the firm’s pricing decisions. Besides the dynamic rent-extraction trade-off between
incoming customers and the current base, the firm would now have to solve an attraction-
attrition trade-off: a more ex-post profitable contract for inactive buyers may enhance the
chance of a customer match, but also increase the likelihood of a voluntary separation. We
propose how to endogenize this margin in Appendix D.1, and discuss the technical challenges
it presents.
Price Discrimination Secondly, we have assumed that sellers cannot price discriminate
across customers of different tenure. While this assumption is realistic for most major sectors
of the economy, especially those in which sellers face a large number of potential buyers (such
as retail, our application in Section 4.1), it may not be apt for certain others, for instance
industries in which personalized buyer-seller relationships may explicitly (newspapers, cell
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phone and Internet services, commercial banks, etc.). Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) propose
a model for such type of relationships, whereby sellers first attract the buyer by offering
her a price discount below her valuation of the good, and charge maximum valuation there-
after. Though the focus of our paper is altogether different, it is still worth emphasizing
that our pricing policy does not collapse to this pricing strategy when we allow for discrim-
ination. Moreover, allowing for discrimination in our environment not only preserves the
block-recursivity property, which is key for tractability, but it also preserves firm dynamics
and price dispersion. Importantly, however, assuming discriminatory contracting gives rise
to a new feature: equilibrium multiplicity in the form of price indeterminacy. We explain
these results in detail in Appendix D.2.
Commitment The third main contractual assumption is that of perfect commitment on
the seller’s side. Intuitively, long-term contracts are a stand-in for a reputational concern on
the side of the firm. By promising to deliver a utility level, the seller can balance the price
with the continuation value to lure customers into remaining matched. In turn, customers
understand that the firm will not price gouge ex-post, and they remain loyal to their seller
in order to avoid going through the costly inactive state. If we were to dispense of the
assumption, we would lose block recursivity and, thereby, the attractive analytical features
of the equilibrium. The reason for this is that, due to a time-inconsistency problem, firms
could engage in various forms of pricing strategies, all of which could be sustained under
“implicit contracts”, paired with trigger strategies on the buyer side (e.g. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2011)). These type of contracts might exhibit history-dependence, which in our
framework would break the recursive structure. Further, sellers would need to keep track
of the buyer distribution, for ex-ante revenue equalization would no longer hold. For these
reasons, seller’s commitment is a key aspect for our set-up.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we outline the estimation exercise, and study how customer accumulation
affects the micro- and macro-economic impact of aggregate shocks on markups.
4.1 Data
We use micro-pricing data on the U.S. retail sector. Although the model is general,
we view the retail sector as fitting well with its basic features. In this interpretation of
the theory, sellers are stores, and buyers are private consumers. We use data of unique
granularity which allows us to focus on narrowly-defined (physically) homogenous products
sold by sellers of different sizes within the same market, in accord with the environment of
the model. The types of goods in the data are non-durable consumption products that, as
in the model, are likely to engage customers and sellers into repeated purchases. The fact
that retail stores face a potentially large number of customers implies that the customer
anonymity assumption likely provides a good approximation for the bulk of the observed
store transactions. Finally, under this framing of the model, we interpret the buyer’s search
cost as a proxy for the transport, information, and/or utility costs associated to finding
and/or switching away from trusted suppliers.
We use micro-level data from the Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) scanner data set
(2001-2007).26 We use weekly average prices for products sold over 5,000 U.S. retail (drug
and grocery) stores on 50 different (geographic) markets defined at the MSA level. Products
are identified by their Universal Product Code (UPC).27 The details of data selection and
variable construction can be found in Appendix A. To capture the degree to which the same
good is sold at different prices by different stores, we follow the literature (e.g. Kaplan et al.
(2018)) and focus on relative prices. The relative price of good u in store s of market m and
week t is the log-deviation from the average price of such good across stores:
p̂usm,t = logPusm,t − 1
Num,t
Num,t∑
s=1
logPusm,t (25)
where Num,t is the number of stores selling the good in that market and week. To measure
price dispersion in the data we take the average of the standard deviation of p̂usm,t across
products, stores, markets, and time. In our selected sub-sample, dispersion is high (10.55%),
in line with previous studies (e.g. Kaplan and Menzio (2015)).
26 The data are available for request at www.iriworldwide.com/en-US/solutions/Academic-Data-Set. For
documentation, see Bronnenberg et al. (2008). Recent studies in economics using the IRI data include Alvarez
et al. (2014), Gagnon and Lo´pez-Salido (2014), and Coibion et al. (2015).
27 The UPC is an array of numerical digits that is uniquely assigned to a given item. The description of
products is very detailed, including information about the brand, flavor, and several packaging attributes.
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4.2 Estimation
To estimate the model, the first step is to parametrize the cost function of firms and
establish the structure of the exogenous shocks. For the former, we choose:
C(n; z, ϕ) = c˜(z, ϕ) · nψ (26)
where c˜(z, ϕ) > 0 is a size-invariant scale parameter, and ψ ≥ 1 is a curvature pa-
rameter controlling for the degree of returns to scale.28 When marginal costs are increas-
ing in size (ψ > 1), there is a natural upper bound on seller size for each state, given by
n∗(z, ϕ) ≡ (ψc˜(z, ϕ)/v) 11−ψ , beyond which the static flow surplus πn(z, ϕ) ≡ nv−C(n; z, ϕ) is
strictly decreasing and the seller does not want to grow further. The scale parameter changes
across sellers and aggregate states, with c˜(z, ϕ) = wez+ϕ, where w > 0 controls the optimal
scale. This specification of shocks is isomorphic to multiplicatively-related idiosyncratic and
aggregate TFP shocks in the production function, standard in the literature (e.g. Kaas and
Kircher (2015)).
Finally, we must parametrize the states. The size grid is N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some
upper bound n < +∞ that is large enough.29 Then, we show:
Proposition 4 (Stability) Given an equilibrium allocation, the dynamical system repre-
sented by the flow equations (19)-(20)-(21) over the grid (n, z) ∈ N × Z is stable, and con-
verges to an invariant distribution for each aggregate state ϕ ∈ Φ. The invariant distribution
can be analytically characterized.
For the proof, see Appendix C.4. Further, we must specify the structure of the exogenous
shocks, (z, ϕ). In principle, we should estimate ks(ks−1) transition rates for each s ∈ {z, ϕ},
a potentially large number. To reduce dimensionality, in practice we assume that the shocks
follow continuous-time analogues of AR(1) processes (or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes), in
logs. This reduces the estimation to only two parameters per shock: a persistence ρ, and a
volatility σ. For details, see Appendix E.1.
Calibration Strategy
We seek to match aggregate moments related to store dynamics in the U.S. retail sector
as well as average moments across all years of our sample of micro-pricing data.
The model is parsimonious, with 11 free parameters to be identified. Of these, 9 are deep
parameters:
(
v, r, δf , δc, w, ψ, κ, γ, c
)
, corresponding to the value of consumption, the time
discount rate, the separation rates of sellers and consumers, the scale and curvature param-
eters of the operating cost function, the entry cost for new sellers, the matching elasticity,
28As seen in Section 3, curvature in the cost function is not necessary for the existence of price dispersion in
the model. However, the parameter ψ will help us pin down the size dependence in prices.
29 In particular, this upper bound is never binding in the sense that n  n∗(z, ϕ). In our estimation, we
assume n = 50.
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and the search cost for inactive buyers, respectively. In addition, we must set values for the
persistence and dispersion parameters of the exogenous productivity state process: (ρz, σz).
We assume that z can take up to kz = 25 different values, and normalize its mean to unity.
We do not estimate the aggregate shocks ϕ because the spirit of our calibration exercise is
to estimate an economy in its long-run equilibrium. These will be re-introduced in Section
5, when we study the response of markups to aggregate supply and demand shocks.
External identification The parameters (v, r, δc) are calibrated outside the model. The
value of consumption is normalized to v = 1, so that the consumption good serves as the
numeraire of the economy. The discount rate is set to r = 0.05, corresponding to a discount
factor of approximately 95% annually. The exogenous separation probability is set to match a
0.044% weekly customer turnover rate (corresponding to δc ≈ 0.2041 at our yearly frequency),
which implies that customer relationships last a bit more than 4 and a half years on average.
We borrow this value from Paciello et al. (2017), who estimated it on the same IRI data
we use here. The number falls within the range of values reported by Gourio and Rudanko
(2014b) (between 10% and 25% annually).
Internal identification Because of the high non-linearity of the model, identifying each
of the remaining parameters separately is unfeasible. However, we can provide some intuition
for how each one is informative about specific moments. We estimate the parameters jointly
by matching a combination of aggregate and seller-level moments via simulated method of
moments (SMM). To implement this procedure, we use an algorithm that randomly searches
in the parameter space, and then employs an unweighted minimum-distance criterion func-
tion that compares empirical moments to model-implied moments from both the stationary
solution as well as simulated data.
For the stationary solution, we solve a fixed-point algorithm that uses value function
iteration on W and a bisection procedure to solve for the value of inactivity, UB. Appendix
E.2 outlines the details of this method.30 To obtain moments from simulated data, we
generate histories for many distinct sellers over T = 100 years of data which we discretize
with time steps of equidistant length Δ = 0.01 each. All sellers are drawn from the stationary
distribution at time t = 0 and evolve endogenously through simulated Markov chains that
replicate the dynamics described in Section 2.5. We drop the first half of the time series
when computing average simulated moments to make sure we draw from the stationary
distribution. For the entrants’ productivity distribution πz, we use the ergodic distribution
implied by the calibrated Markov chain for z.
The set of targeted moments can be grouped into two broad categories: (i) aggregate
moments, and (ii) store-level moments related to the distribution of sales and prices. At the
aggregate level, we target an average annual entry rate of 8.9%, which we compute for our
30 Further, in Appendix F.3 we show that, for a given UB , W has a unique fixed point, and therefore the VFI
method is convergent.
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IRI sample as the average across years 2001-2007 of the ratio of stores aged 52 weeks or less
to the total number of existing stores within that year. We define the entry rate in the model
as the ratio of actual entrants to the total mass of incumbents. The exit rate is the measure
of sellers who either die or lose their last remaining customer. By equation (21), this means:
EntryRate =
S0∑
n,z Sn(z)
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)η
(
θ1(z0)
)
; ExitRate = δf + δc
∑
z S1(z)∑
n,z Sn(z)
(27)
These formulas hold in and out of steady state, but are equal to each other in the absence
of ϕ-shocks, so the entry rate in the data helps us identify the exogenous exit rate δf in the
model. At the aggregate level, we also target the cross-sectional average markup. Because
measuring markups in the data usually requires a stand on market structure and the demand
curve faced by firms, in the literature estimates vary substantially depending on the empirical
methodology used, the industry of consideration, and the overall sample. Using firm-level
data, typical estimates range from about 10% to as much as 50% or more.31 We choose to
target a markup of 39%, a number that we impute from the average ratio over our sample
period (2001-2007) of gross margins to sales in the retail sector.32 To be consistent with the
empirical target, in the model we compute measured markups as the sales-weighted average
of the ratio of price to marginal cost:
m =
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
mn(z); with mn(z) ≡ sn(z) pn(z)
mcn(z)
(28)
where sn(z) =
npn(z)∑
n,z npn(z)
is the sales share of type (n, z) firms, and mcn(z) ≡ C(n; z) −
C(n − 1; z) is the marginal cost of this type of firms. Though many parameters affect the
average markup, γ is the most relevant one, as it governs how the gains from trade are shared
between the customers and their seller.
At the store level, we target moments from the distribution of prices and sales that we
obtain from our IRI sample. The cost parameters (ψ,w) determine firm profitability across
sizes, so they play an important role in determining the degree by which firms of similar
productivity choose to set different prices for the same product. We choose to target two
moments that relate to this dimension of heterogeneity. First, we target price dispersion
(10.55% in the data). Second, we target the inter-decile range in the distribution of relative
prices between the tenth percentile and the median relative price, equal to 1.1215 (see Table
31 For example, DeLoecker and Warzynski (2012) find that median markups range from 10% to 28% for
Slovenia, depending on the specification, while DeLoecker et al. (2016) find even more variation, from 15% up
to 43%, using similar methods for India. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) report an average markup of
37% for the Euro area, and of 32% for the U.S.
32We obtain this number from the latest Annual Retail Trade Report of the U.S. Census Bureau
(https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html). The average gross margin is about 28%, implying an average
markup of .28/(1− .28) ≈ .39. For comparison, Hottman (2017) estimates average markups in the U.S. retail
sector and finds slightly lower numbers, in the range 29-33%.
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A.2 in the Appendix). We target this measure of left-tail dispersion because the size distri-
bution is right-skewed, and thus matching the lower end of the distribution will ensure that
we capture the pricing behavior of the bulk of population of sellers.
Next, we need to discipline the parameters of the exogenous productivity process, z. We
target the yearly autocorrelation in normalized store-level sales (pinning down the persistence
ρz), and the dispersion in the distribution of normalized sales (pinning down the volatility
σz). Finally, we need to calibrate the search cost for buyers, c, and the market penetration
cost for sellers, κ. As we discussed in Section 3, these parameters are important to pin down
the dependence between seller size and seller price, which determines two key aspects of
firm dynamics: (i) the growth rate of sellers across sizes; and (ii) the stationary size. For
the former, we target the correlation between store product-level sales growth rates and the
relative price of those products. For the latter, we target the stationary size of sellers in the
data, so that the average size in the model and the data are comparable. In the model, we
measure the average size of firms as the mean number of units sold per firm. Since each
customer consumes only one unit, the average size is (see e.g. Luttmer (2006)):
L =
(∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
1
n
Ln(z)
)−1
; with Ln(z) ≡ nSn(z)∑
n,z nSn(z)
(29)
where Ln(z) is the fraction of active buyers that are customers of sellers of type (n, z).
In our sample, the average number of units sold of each product within a store is 12.4 in
volume-equivalent terms,33 so we target this number in the estimation.
Estimation Results
Table 1 presents the full set of calibrated parameters. Table 2 shows the result of the
calibration exercise in terms of moment-matching. The fit is reasonably good. We are able
to match both aggregate entry rates and average markups accurately, as well as the average
and the left-tail dispersion in relative prices. The model slightly under-predicts dispersion
in normalized sales, probably as the result of outliers in the data. On the other hand, the
correlation between sales growth and relative prices in the model is slightly strong relative
to its empirical counterpart. This likely reflects factors attenuating the relationship between
prices and sales that are not captured by the model.34
Figure 4 plots the joint surplus, pricing policy function, measured markups, and promised
utility, in the space of seller sizes (n) and productivities (z), for the calibrated set of parameter
values. We find that matches with more customers and higher productivity levels (i.e. lower
values for z) earn a larger surplus. Moreover, we find that the pricing policy is increasing in
33 The IRI sample provides a conversion system whereby units of different product categories can be made
comparable. We use this standardization for this calculation.
34 To get a visual idea of identification, Figure B.4 in the Appendix plots each calibrated moment against the
distribution across different model simulation runs that results from our parameter-search algorithm. We see
that, with a few exceptions, the calibrated moment is close to the median of this distribution.
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Param. Value Description Source / Target
Calibrated externally
v 1 Value of consumption Normalization
r 0.05 Discount rate 5% annual risk-free rate
δc 0.2041 Separation rate Paciello et al. (2017)
Estimated internally
δf 0.0738 Firm exit rate Annual store entry rate
γ 0.5339 Matching elasticity Average markup
ψ 1.4044 Cost curvature Standard deviation of relative prices
w 0.1510 Cost scale p50-p10 inter-decile range in relative prices
c 0.5457 Buyer search cost Average store size
κ 1.6214 Firm entry cost Sales growth and relative price correlation
ρz 0.0751 Persistence of z Autocorrelation in normalized store sales
σz 0.1034 Volatility of z Dispersion in normalized store sales
Frequency Annual
Table 1: Full set of calibrated parameters in the baseline estimation. Notes: The param-
eters (ρz , σz) correspond to the Euler-Maruyama equation (E.1) of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process for z. See Appendix E.1 for details.
Moment Model Data Data Source
A. Aggregate moments
Annual entry rate 0.087 0.089 IRI
Average markup (2001-07) 1.388 1.383 U.S. Census
B. Store-level moments
sd(Relative prices) 0.1072 0.1055 IRI (Table A.1)
p50-p10 IDR relative prices 1.1224 1.1215 IRI (Table A.1)
Average store size 10.73 12.44 IRI
corr(Sales growth, Relative price) –0.023 –0.007 IRI
ac(Normalizes sales) 0.854 0.828 IRI
sd(Normalized sales) 0.6 0.474 IRI
Table 2: Targeted moments: model versus data. Notes: Average markup is weighted by
sales shares. IDR means inter-decile range. sd, corr, and ac mean “standard deviation”,
“correlation”, and “autocorrelation”, respectively.
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Figure 4: Joint surplus function, pricing policy function, sales-weighted markups, and
promised utility, in the (n, z) space, for the calibrated set of parameters. Higher values of z
mean higher costs per customer (i.e. lower productivity).
the size of the customer base, and decreasing in productivity. Even though marginal costs are
higher for larger firms (as ψ > 1), measured markups are still increasing in size. In Figure 5
we plot the distribution of normalized sales and that of the seller’s customer base that result
from the simulation of the estimated model. The figure demonstrates that our model can
generate an invariant size distribution with a fat right-tail in both seller revenues and output
that resembles its empirical counterpart (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). We also show
(panel (c)) the age distribution, to demonstrate that most small sellers in the economy are
young.
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Figure 5: Sales, customer, and seller age distributions, for the simulated economy under
the calibrated set of parameters. Sales have been normalized by their mean.
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Validation
To validate the results of our calibration, we assess the model’s performance on non-
targeted moments. We look at two sets of moments. First, we check the model’s performance
on other measures of relative price dispersion, namely inter-decile ranges between the first
and ninth deciles, and fifth and ninth deciles. The results are in Panel A of Table 3. The
model’s predictions regarding these measures are in line with the microdata.
We also look at the model’s ability to generate a quantitatively correct behavior of price
changes. For this exercise, in the model we compute micro-price statistics along the station-
ary solution using the formulas derived in Appendix G. In the data, we define the weekly
frequency of price changes within a store and market of interest as the share of goods sold by
that store in that week that experience a price change.35 For the moments of the distribu-
tion of price changes, we look at the absolute value of log differences. Finally, we annualize
frequencies and rates in the model and the data.
Moment Model Data
A. Distribution of Relative Prices
p90-p10 range 1.1994 1.2504
p90-p50 range 1.0508 1.1149
B. Distribution of Price Changes
Average frequency 0.9639 0.9609 annualized
Median frequency 0.9814 0.9264 annualized
Average implied duration 0.2788 0.7817 years
Median implied duration 0.2503 0.3568 years
Average absolute change 0.0305 0.0313 log-points
Median absolute change 0.0312 0.0197 log-points
St. Dev. absolute change 0.0505 0.1415 %-points
Table 3: Non-targeted moments: model vs. data. Notes: Data moments are taken from
our IRI sample. See Appendix G for the calculation and aggregation of firm-level price
statistics in the model.
Panel B in Table 3 reports the simulated moments and their empirical counterparts. The
calibrated model does a good job in predicting the empirical frequency of price changes, even
though these moments were not targeted. The model predicts relatively well the median price
duration, though the average duration is not accurately predicted because the distribution
35We focus only on regular price changes, which we define (following Coibion et al. (2015)) as changes in prices
that are larger than 1% or $0.01 in absolute value for products that are neither entering nor coming out of
promotion, and whose initial price is less than, or equal to, $5. For non-promotional goods with initial prices
higher than $5, this threshold 0.5%. These criteria eliminate small price changes that may be due to rounding
or reporting errors. Promotional goods are flagged by the IRI directly. In order to filter out temporary price
reductions that may not have been flagged, we also exclude changes that return to their initial level within 3
weeks after the initial change.
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of price durations in the model is not sufficiently skewed.36 The model also predicts several
moments of the distribution of expected price changes, especially the average price change
and the median. We can explain about one third of the dispersion in the size of price changes,
even though the model was not calibrated for this purpose. Figure B.3 in Appendix B shows
how these measures of price changes vary across firm size, with smaller firms experiencing
more frequent and larger price changes.
36 To transform frequency f to duration d, we use d = − 1log(1−f) . See details in Appendix G. For medians, we
apply the formula directly on the median frequency to obtain the median duration. For means, we first use
the formula to compute the implied duration for each store and price, and then take the mean.
37We call procyclicality the positive comovement between the response of the variable in question and the
measure of active buyers (which equals aggregate output because each buyer consumes one unit).
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5 The Response to Aggregate Shocks
In this section, we analyze the impact of aggregate supply and demand shocks at both
the macroeconomic level as well as in the cross-section of firms using the estimated model.
We seek to understand how sellers’ incentives to accumulate customers can generate ampli-
fication and persistence through both level and distributional effects, generate incomplete
pass-through on prices, and imply procyclicality in markups.37
Because the equilibrium is block-recursive, aggregate dynamics in the model are inter-
nalized by agents, so the shocks and their aftermath are fully anticipated. This makes the
shocks akin to business cycles fluctuations.
Supply Shocks
Starting from the stationary equilibrium of the calibrated economy, we study the response
to a temporary negative 1% supply shock to the marginal cost. The aggregate state ϕ follows
a mean-reverting process in logs (details in Appendix E.1). The shock hits at some time t0,
and the process continues without further shocks for t > t0. Figure 6 presents the results.
The response of the economy to the aggregate shock combines both level and compositional
effects. Let us describe each of these in detail.
First, due to an increase in the cost of serving each customer (panel (a)), the flow payoff
in joint surplus falls on impact (panel (b)). To mitigate the effects on their own profits, sellers
lower the continuation utility that they promise to deliver to each customer going forward
(panel (c)). Thus, active buyers are hit harder by the shock than sellers. As a result, firms
attract less inactive buyers, for ex-ante values from matching have lowered. The average
tightness in the market falls (panel (d)), and with it firm growth. Interestingly, while prices
increase in response to the shock, the pass-through is incomplete (panel (e)). The increase in
prices is due to the fact that, when faced with an adverse shock to their costs, sellers choose to
re-balance their contracts by front-loading payments from their buyers. They implement this
by choosing to exploit their customers more today (through a higher price). Yet, to honor
37We call procyclicality the positive comovement between the response of the variable in question and the
measure of active buyers (which equals aggregate output because each buyer consumes one unit).
their promises, they must choose an increasing path of buyer utilities in the transition. As
the shock is smoothed out inter-temporally via these two contracting instruments, the price
response is muted. In the calibrated economy, in particular, the price response is about 12%
the size of the shock. Note, moreover, that this dynamic re-balancing of payments increases
flow sales in spite of the decrease in the extensive margin of demand, though this increase is
only temporary (panel (f), solid line). Flow profits decrease, in contrast, as the rise in sales
is overwhelmed by the increase in costs (panel (f), dashed line).
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of selected variables to a negative and temporary 1% shock to aggregate productivity (i.e. an increase in the
marginal cost).
Notes: All responses expressed in %-deviations from steady-state. The shock hits at date t0 = 0. The shock is implemented with kϕ = 25
grid nodes, and paths are smoothed out with cubic splines. Panel (a) depicts the path of the exogenous state. Panels (b) to (f) depict
cross-sectional averages using the simulated distribution of firms over idiosyncratic states. That is, for any policy or value function f(n, z),
we plot the %-deviation of 1
Nt
∑
n,z f(n, z)mt(n, z), where mt(n, z) is the count of firms of type (n, z) at time t, and Nt ≡
∑
n,z mt(n, z) is
the total count of incumbent firms. The average number of customers per firm in panel (h) is computed using equation (29). Panels (i) and
(j) are computed using equation (27). Panel (l) is computed using equation (28).
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Since prices react less than one-for-one, the average measured markup (panel (l), solid
line) falls with output, i.e. it is procyclical. Looking at the response by seller size, we find that
smaller sellers (dashed line) respond stronger on impact, while the largest sellers’ response
(dotted line) is weaker than the average. Similar features have been documented in the data.
For instance, Hong (2017) has found differential responses of markups across firm sizes, with
smaller firms displaying more elastic responses to output shocks. In the model, this occurs
because smaller sellers experience more frequent and larger price changes per unit of time,
since the optimal pricing policy is concave in seller size.
To explain the behavior of measured markups in the transition and in the cross section, we
must first understand the distributional consequences of the shock. First, the rate of inactive
buyers gradually increases (panel (g)), so firms start to shrink on average (panel (h)). These
trends continue for a few periods, until they are eventually reversed by the continued increase
in promised utilities and seller growth rates. In the first phase of the transition, therefore,
the size distribution is gradually shifting to the left. Because measured markups and size
are positively correlated in the calibrated economy, the increase in the relative measure of
small firms means that the contribution of low-markup firms to the aggregate markup is now
relatively more important. Therefore, the persistence of the shock on markups is higher for
smaller sellers, as reflected in the fact that markups take longer to mean-revert for these type
of sellers relative to larger ones.38
To recap, sellers smooth out the effects of the adverse shock inter-temporally by raising
prices imperfectly and depressing promised utilities. For further illustration of this result,
Figure 7 shows how the responses discussed above vary with the average duration of customer
relationships, as measured by δc. In particular, we compare the baseline economy (solid),
with an economy in which the duration of customer relationships is one-third shorter (dashed)
and the remaining parameters remain fixed at their original calibrated values. In line with
our intuition, Figure 7 shows that the response is dampened when customer relationships
are shorter (that is, when δc is higher). This is because, when sellers expect their customers
38 Let us also explain the behavior of the entry and exit rates. First, since the risk of exiting has become
higher for smaller firms, the aggregate exit rate goes up (panel (i)). Interestingly, the entry rate goes up as
well (panel (j)), so much so that the number of inactive sellers decreases (panel (k)). Indeed, in the entry
market the tightness has increased (unlike other markets). This is because, in order to enter into the economy,
potential sellers must raise resources to pay for the fixed market penetration cost, κ. Since inactive buyers’
ex-ante match value has worsen, the seller must now raise the initial promised compensation enough in order
to guarantee that the costs of entry are still being recouped in expectation.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of selected variables to a negative and temporary 1% shock
to aggregate productivity (i.e. an increase in the marginal cost), for different values of δc.
Notes: See Figure 6.
to remain captive for a shorter time, sellers care more about their immediate profits, so
promised utility needs to decrease less on impact (panel (a)) as these captive buyers are not
expected to remain matched for long. Accordingly, the seller can charge higher prices on
impact (panel (c)), thereby alleviating the adverse effects of the shock on her own valuation
(panel (b)). The effects of the shock on prices and continuation utilities become naturally
less persistent. Finally, since the price pass-through is less incomplete as δc increases, the
absolute response of the average markup (panel (d)) is weaker. In the limit as δc gets very
large, markups would be acyclical to marginal cost shocks, as prices would respond one-for-
one and promised utilities would remain unaffected by the shock.
Demand Shocks
Recent research has emphasized the relevance that consumer shopping behavior may have
on macroeconomic dynamics (e.g. Bai et al. (2017), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015),
Paciello et al. (2017)). In these papers, a shock in demand can have a strong impact on
search incentives, and lead to persistent price responses. In this section, we argue that the
underlying size heterogeneity and the forces of firm entry of our model can provide additional
insights into the response of markups to aggregate demand shocks.
We consider a shock to the instantaneous utility v. We implement a 1% negative shock
to v at time t0, and let the process mean-revert without any further shocks for all t > t0. We
choose an autocorrelation for the ϕ process implying a half life of about three years, following
Paciello et al. (2017) and in line with estimates by Bai et al. (2017).Figure 8 presents the
results. A negative shock to the utility from consumption leads to a decrease in the number
of buyers looking for a seller, since consumption is worth less. Because the buyers’ outside
option has relatively improved, firms lower the promised utility in an attempt to smooth
the effects of the shock. Once again, the burden of the shock is passed almost entirely on
to the customer: the seller’s value decreases only slightly (panel (c), dashed line), and it is
the decrease in the value of the buyer (panel (c), solid line) which accounts for the bulk of
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of selected variables to a negative and temporary 1% shock to aggregate demand (i.e. a decrease in the utility
of consumption v), expressed in %-deviations from steady-state. Notes: See Figure 6.
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the drop in joint surplus (panel (b)). Market tightness falls on impact (panel (d)), leading
to a drop in the matching rate which causes sellers to progressively shrink in size (panel
(h)), and more buyers to remain inactive (panel (g)). In this respect, the demand shock is
akin to a productivity shock (Figure 6), in line with the intuition in Bai et al. (2017). The
compositional effects are similar to those in our previous analysis: a left-ward shift in the
firm size distribution, which accounts for the increase in the exit rate and in the relative
contribution of low-markup firms to the average response. However, the behavior of prices
in response to the demand shock is different than before.
First, the incomplete pass-through that we observed for supply shocks, and which was
due to firms optimally tilting their pricing contract toward more immediate payoffs through
higher prices today, is no longer present here. A shock to the marginal propensity to consume
has a one-for-one impact on the extensive margin of demand because of linearity in consumer
preferences. This means that all the adjustment has to be made along promised utilities,
which respond a lot more to the demand shock compared to the case of supply shocks. Sellers
understand the temporary nature of the shock ex-ante, so in the transition they increase their
promises, and seller growth picks up. As before, the size distribution shifts left in a first phase
of the transition, and returns back to its original position in the long-run. Thus, the level
effects of the demand shock are accompanied by interesting compositional effects.
As a result of the demand shock, the relative attractiveness of small firms improves, as
markups decrease relatively more for these firms (see panel (l)). This induces a short-lived
spike in the entry of small seller, and a further downward pressure on prices. In addition, the
entry of (small) sellers causes a surge in the contribution of low-price firms to the aggregate
price level. At the other end of the distribution, the shock decreases the relative mass of large
sellers, which attenuates the markup response for these type of sellers. Thus, the cyclicality
in the response of measured markups is partly explained by compositional shifts in the firm
distribution, whereby the entry of new firms with low prices amplifies the response of the
economy to aggregate shocks.
Summing up, while prices in the model are procyclical after demand shocks and coun-
tercyclical after supply shocks, markups are always procyclical to both supply and demand
shocks. Markup procyclicality is a feature that standard models of price rigidities, such
as the New Keynesian model, have trouble replicating, particularly conditional on demand
shocks. Yet, recent empirical studies tend to rule against countercyclical markup variation
conditional on either type of shock (e.g. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)). We have proposed a
micro-founded mechanism through which this empirical observation can be rationalized as
the optimal response of firms concerned with building up a stock of demand.
The Margins of Price Adjustment
To conclude, we seek to further understand the main margins along which prices adjust
in response to aggregate shocks. For this, we decompose the price response into the response
of the different price components that we identified in equation (15).
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to negative and temporary 1% supply and demand shocks
(same as Figures 6-8). Decomposition of the average price response by the price components
identified in equation (15). Each component is averaged using the theoretical distribution
of sellers across states. The exogenous shock adjustments (last two terms of equation (15))
are not being plotted.
Figure 9 shows the response of each component, for the same supply and demand shocks
introduced above. First, we observe that the “baseline” component of price is a more re-
sponsive in the case of a demand shock, overwhelming the other components, and ultimately
explaining why the overall price response is procyclical after a demand shock. For a supply
shock, this effect is attenuated by the contractual mechanism of incomplete pass-through
explained above. In both cases, the “growth” component is procyclical, while the “exit” and
“separation” components are countercyclical.39
In sum, in response to adverse supply shocks, sellers grow more concerned with expanding
their base (as they offer large price compensation through this margin to generate high rates
of subsequent growth). While this phenomenon is to some also extent present after adverse
demand shocks, in that case prices change primarily because the seller’s current buyers
depress their valuation for consumption.
39 For the former, the reason is that, even though sellers respond to both types of shocks by cutting promised
utilities, smaller sellers make relatively bigger cuts as demand is more elastic for them. Thus, the relative value
of an additional customer (the object xn+1 − xn) goes up after a negative shock, so sellers overcompensate
customers in their price level for the eventuality of growing.
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customer capital at the microeconomic level and the macroeconomic dynamics of prices. In
the model, sellers of different sizes strategically use menus of prices and continuation promises
in order to trade off two conflicting concerns: attracting new customers to increase future
market share, and extracting surplus from incumbent customers to increase current profits.
The model exhibits cross-sectional price dispersion, and offers a micro-founded interpretation
for sluggish firm- and aggregate- dynamics.
We have analyzed a number of predictions on both pricing and firm dynamics dimensions.
Using product-level data from the U.S. retail sector, we have estimated the model and con-
ducted experiments on the response of the economy to aggregate shocks to productivity and
demand. We have found both level and compositional effects. In response to adverse and
mean-reverting aggregate shocks, sellers inter-temporally smooth out the effects of the shock
on prices by transferring the burden onto their future buyers, giving rise to an incomplete
price response and markup procyclicality. Moreover, we have also shown that smaller sellers
experience stronger and more persistent responses.
Overall, these results suggest that incorporating micro-founded pricing behavior into
quantitative macro models can help us understand certain patterns of macroeconomic dy-
namics and firm heterogeneity. Further investigating how customer markets may help explain
these and other dimensions remains an exciting avenue for future work.
6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that a major source of variation in the performance of busi-
nesses stems from heterogeneity in idiosyncratic demand components across firms. Further,
price differences are key to explain revenue differences for firms that operate within the
same product markets and under similar productivity levels. These observations may al-
ter our understanding of how markups behave at the aggregate level. We have presented a
dynamic search model of demand accumulation through pricing with aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks and a relevant scope for firm dynamics in order to study the connection between
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Appendix
A Data Description
The IRI scanner dataset spans a period of 12 years (from the first week of January 2001 to the
last week of December 2012), and contains revenue and quantity information for over 5,000 retail
(drug and grocery) stores over 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in the U.S. The data are
automatically generated by retailers through their point-of-sale systems. Products, at the UPC level,
are grouped into broad categories. We narrow our attention to two large geographical markets (New
York and Los Angeles) in the period 2001-2007, and consider 15 product categories.40 We back out
the weekly average price (P ) from revenues (R) and quantities (Q):
Pusm,t =
Rusm,t
Qusm,t
for each UPC u within week t, in store s and (geographic) market m. Throughout, we restrict our
sample to products that are commonly available across stores and not only sold in specific establish-
ments. Given the overall number of stores in our sample, we drop goods sold in less than 10 stores
on any week×market. To eliminate outliers, we drop stores with non-positive sales, transactions with
prices above $100 (accounting for the top .02% of the price distribution in the full sample), and cases
with multiple observations at the store×market×week×UPC level, which we deem as mis-reported
transactions. Finally, in the absence of a theory of price discounts, we focus only on regular prices
by filtering out of the sample products on sale. A convenient feature of the data is that products are
flagged whenever they go on promotion, which means that we need not employ a filtering algorithm
as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) but we can rather exclude flagged products directly.41
Full Sample Sub-Sample
Number of product categories 15 15
Number of chains 64 64
Number of stores 278 278
Number of UPCs 19,721 11,483
Stores per chain (average) 27 26
Stores per product (average) 59 88
Products per store (average) 4,180 3,638
Average price (USD) 7.75 8.32
Price dispersion 15.73% 10.55%
Total sales (Billion USD) 2.86 1.60
Number of weeks 365 365
MSAs considered NY, LA NY, LA
Number of observations 89,112,170 59,813,217
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics before and after sample selection. Source: IRI data.
40 The categories are: Beer, Blades, Carbonated Beverages, Cigarettes, Coffee, Cold Cereal, Deodorant, Dia-
pers, Frozen Pizza, Frozen Dinners, Household Cleaners, Hotdogs, Laundry Detergent, Margarine and Butter,
and Mayonnaise.
41A “promotion” is defined by the IRI as a temporary price reduction of 5% or greater. Sales are quite
unresponsive to the business cycle, as documented by Coibion et al. (2015) for the IRI data, and therefore
excluding should not change our life-cycle results significantly.
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Table A.1 shows some descriptive statistics of our data before and after applying these restrictions.
Price dispersion is measured as the average standard deviation of p̂usm,t (equation (25)) across prod-
ucts, stores, markets, and time. In our full sample, dispersion at the barcode level is high (15.73%),
in line with previous studies using similar micro pricing data from different sources (e.g. Kaplan
and Menzio (2015)). The restricted sample has a lower dispersion (10.55%), as a result of having
eliminated price outliers and uncommon goods. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of relative prices
in our sample, alongside that of normalized sales (the ratio of store-level sales to its mean) and store
sales growth rates. Table A.2 presents summary statistics for these distributions. We see that the
store size distribution has a fat right tail, which accounts for the high dispersion in normalized sales.
Relative Normalized Sales
prices sales growth
Mean 0 1 –.0008
Median .0009 .9087 –.0003
Percentiles
1st –.3257 .2729 –.1905
25th –.0415 .6656 –.0378
75th .0486 1.2281 .0373
90th .1097 1.7029 .0765
99th .2809 2.3819 .1782
Dispersion
St. Dev. .1055 .4744 .0694
p90-p10 range 1.2504 3.6163 1.1661
p90-p50 range 1.1149 1.8740 1.0798
p50-p10 range 1.1215 1.9297 1.0799
Table A.2: Distribution of relative prices, normalized store sales (i.e. the ratio of total
dollar sales within the store to average sales across products sold in the store), and annualized
sales growth rates, across the whole 2001-2007 sample. Source: IRI weekly data.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of normalized store sales (top), store sales growth rates (middle),
and relative prices at the UPC level (bottom) in our final sample. Source: IRI weekly data.
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B Additional Figures
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Figure B.1: Seller transitional dynamics for a typical incumbent (right-hand side block)
and for entrants (left-hand side block), where ϕ is fixed for expositional ease. Labels on
arrows indicate flow rates.
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Figure B.2: Same as Figure 3, but with a lower value for κ.
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Figure B.3: Hazard rate, frequency, duration, expected price change, and price change
dispersion, as a function of size (n), in the calibrated economy.
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Figure B.4: Histograms of calibrated moments across different simulated economies in the
parameter-search SMM algorithm. The dashed vertical line marks the calibrated value. The
solid vertical line is the median of the distribution.
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C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1: Joint Surplus Problem
Proof. Denote by ω =
{
p,x′(n′; s′)
}
a generic policy of the typical seller in state (n; z, ϕ), where
p is the price level,
x′(n′; s′) =
{
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ), x′(n− 1; z, ϕ),{x′(n; z′, ϕ) : z′ ∈ Z},{x′(n; z, ϕ′) : ϕ′ ∈ Φ}}
is the set of promised utilities, and x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ) and x′(n− 1; z, ϕ) are the upsizing and downsizing
choices, respectively. Recall that x′(n; z, ϕ) = x by stationarity.
The value of the seller in equilibrium, V S(n, x; z, ϕ), can be written as the maximand on the
right-hand side of (6), evaluated at ω. That is:
V S(n, x; z, ϕ) = max
ω∈Ω
V˜ S(n; z, ϕ|ω) s.t. x ≤ V B(n,ω; z, ϕ)
where V˜ S(n; z, ϕ|ω) is given by:42
V˜ S(n; z, ϕ|ω) ≡ 1
ρ(n; z, ϕ)
[
pn− C(n; z, ϕ) + η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ);ϕ
))
V S
(
n+ 1, x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ); z, ϕ
)
(C.1.1)
+ nδcV
S
(
n− 1, x′(n− 1; z, ϕ); z, ϕ
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)V S
(
n, x′(n; z′, ϕ); z′, ϕ
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)V S
(
n, x′(n; z, ϕ′); z, ϕ′
)]
and we have defined ρ(n; z, ϕ) ≡ r + δf + nδc + η
(
θ(x′(n + 1; z, ϕ);ϕ)
)
as the effective discount
rate of the firm.
From (C.1.1), it is optimal to offer the highest possible price that is consistent with promise-
keeping, for any given policy ω. Indeed, the price has no bearing on the agents’ incentives within the
search market. Therefore, the PK constraint must bind with equality, and we can solve for the price
p such that x = V B(n,ω; z, ϕ) using equation (5):
pPK : x′(n′; s′) →
{
v(ϕ)− ρ(n; z, ϕ)x+ δfUB(ϕ) + η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ);ϕ
))
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ) (C.1.2)
+ δc
(
UB(ϕ) + (n− 1)x′(n− 1; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)x′(n; z′, ϕ) +
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)x′(n; z, ϕ′)
}
Using the above notation, we can now substitute the price level pPK
(
x′(n′; s′)
)
from (C.1.2) into
the seller’s value (C.1.1). After some straightforward algebra, we obtain:
W˜ (n, x; z, ϕ|ω) = 1
ρ(n; z, ϕ)
[
n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕ)
)[ ( )
42Here we are arguing by free-entry that V˜ S(0; ∅, ϕ) = 0, ∀ϕ ∈ Φ, to simplify the expression for V˜ S . Moreover,
we use that
∑
z′∈Z λz(z
′|z) =∑ϕ′∈Φ λϕ(ϕ′|ϕ) = 0.
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−
(
C(n; z, ϕ) + η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ);ϕ
))
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ)
)
+ η
(
θ
(
x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ);ϕ
))
W
(
n+ 1, x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ); z, ϕ
)
+ nδcW
(
n− 1, x′(n− 1; z, ϕ); z, ϕ
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)W
(
n, x′(n; z′, ϕ); z′, ϕ
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)W
(
n, x′(n; z, ϕ′); z, ϕ′
)]
(C.1.3)
where we have defined:
W˜ (n, x; z, ϕ|ω) ≡ V˜ S(n; z, ϕ|ω) + nx and W (n, x; z, ϕ) ≡ max
ω∈Ω
W˜ (n, x; z, ϕ|ω)
as the joint surplus under contract ω, and the maximized joint surplus, respectively. Next, note
that the right-hand side of equation (C.1.3) does not depend on x nor p, and so we can write the joint
surplus under a given policy as:
W˜ (n, x; z, ϕ|ω) = W˜n
(
x′(n′; s′); z, ϕ
)
This proves Part 2 of the proposition. Part 1 now readily follows. Since the joint surplus is
invariant to the price level by construction, the optimal contract can be found by splitting the program
into two separate stages. In the first stage, the seller chooses the vector of continuation values x′(n′; s′)
that maximizes (C.1.3). In the second stage, once the surplus has been maximized, the seller chooses
the promise-compatible price level via equation (C.1.2).
Formally, the optimal contract is ω∗ =
{
p∗,x′∗(n′; s′)
}
, where:
x′∗(n′; s′) ≡ argmax
x
W˜n
(
x; z, ϕ
)
(C.1.4a)
p∗ ≡ pPK
(
x′∗(n′; s′)
)
(C.1.4b)
By expressing the problem of the seller in terms of W˜ , we have just shown that the contract that
is optimally chosen by the firm, ω∗, must maximize the joint surplus. Conversely, for any vector
x′(n′; s′) of continuation values that maximizes the joint surplus, there is a price level, given by
p∗ = pPK
(
x′∗(n′; s′)
)
, that maximizes the seller’s value subject to the PK constraint.
Therefore, the seller’s problem (equation (6)) and the joint surplus problem (equations (C.1.4a)-
(C.1.4b)) are equivalent. 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Efficiency
Proof. Consider a benevolent planner that is constrained by the search frictions of the economy
and seeks to maximize aggregate welfare subject to the resource constraints of the economy. The
planner can allocate resources freely, so the problem does not feature contracts or prices. Instead,
we label each market segment directly by its tightness, θ. To simplify notation, it is understood that
time subscripts embody the entire history of aggregate shocks, which is taken to be some arbitrary
path ϕt = (ϕj : j ≤ t) ⊆ Φ.
The planner chooses:
• The tightness in each market segment, Θt ≡
{
θnt,t(zt) : (nt, zt) ∈ N×Z
}
;
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• Distributions of inactive and active buyers across markets, BIt ≡
{
BInt,t(zt) : (nt, zt) ∈ N× Z
}
and BAt ≡
{
BAnt,t(zt) : (nt, zt) ∈ N×Z
}
;
• A measure of potential entrants S0,t;
• A distribution of firms across states, St ≡
{
Snt,t(zt) : (nt, zt) ∈ N×Z
}
.
The planner’s objective is:
max
Θt,B
I
t ,B
A
t
S0,t,St
E0
∫ +∞
0
e−rtWt(ϕt)dt (C.2.1)
where
Wt(ϕt) = −κ(ϕt)S0,t +
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
[
v(ϕt)B
A
nt,t(zt)− C(nt; zt, ϕt)Snt,t(zt)− c(ϕt)BInt,t(zt)
]
The planner is subject to three sets of constraints. The first one concerns the evolution of the
firm distribution:
∂tS0,t = δf
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
Snt,t(zt) + δc
∑
zt∈Z
S1,t(zt)−
∑
ze∈Z
πz(z
e)η
(
θ1,t(z
e)
)
S0,t (C.2.2a)
∂tS1,t(zt) = πz(zt)η
(
θ1,t(zt)
)
S0,t + 2δcS2,t(zt) +
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(zt|z˜)S1,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + δc + η
(
θ2,t(zt)
)
+
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(z˜|zt)
)
S1,t(zt) (C.2.2b)
∀nt ≥ 2 : ∂tSnt,t(zt) = η
(
θnt,t(zt)
)
Snt−1,t(zt) + (nt + 1)δcSnt+1,t(zt) +
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(zt|z˜)Snt,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + ntδc + η
(
θnt+1,t(zt)
)
+
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(z˜|zt)
)
Snt,t(zt); (C.2.2c)
for all zt ∈ Z, where ze denotes the productivity draw upon entry. The second set of constraints
describes the distribution of buyers across firms at any given time:
∀(nt, zt) ∈ N×Z : BAnt,t(zt) = ntSnt,t(zt) (C.2.3a)
∀(nt, zt) ∈ N×Z : BInt,t(zt) = θnt,t(zt)Snt−1,t(zt) (C.2.3b)
1 =
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
(
BAnt,t(zt) +B
I
nt,t(zt)
)
(C.2.3c)
Equation (C.2.3a) states that each customer consumes a single unit; equation (C.2.3b) states that
each market segment is in equilibrium, in the sense that the measure of buyers who find a firm in
any given market equals the measure of firms within that market who find a new customer; equation
(C.2.3c) says that every buyer in the economy is in either the active or the inactive state.
Finally, the mass of potential entering firms must be non-negative in any aggregate state:
S0,t ≥ 0 (C.2.4)
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To solve, first we use constraints (C.2.3a) and (C.2.3b) to rewrite (C.2.3c) as:
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
ntSnt,t(zt) +
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
θnt+1,t(zt)Snt,t(zt) + S0,t
∑
zt∈Z
θ1,t(zt) = 1 (C.2.5)
Substituting constraints (C.2.3a) and (C.2.3b) into the objective function:
max
Θt,S0,t,St
E0
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
{
−
(
κ(ϕt) + c(ϕt)
∑
zt∈Z
θ1(zt)
)
S0,t + v(ϕt)
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
ntSnt,t(zt)
−
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
C(nt; zt, ϕt)Snt,t(zt)− c(ϕt)
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
θnt+1,t(zt)Snt,t(zt)
}
dt
subject to (C.2.2a), (C.2.2b), (C.2.2c), (C.2.4), and (C.2.5). Conveniently, the variables BIt and
BAt have disappeared from the problem. The state vector now only includes measures of firms:
St ≡ [S0,t,St]. The current-value Hamiltonian of the simplified planning problem is:
Ht(Θt; St) ≡ −
(
κ(ϕt) + c(ϕt)
∑
zt∈Z
θ1(zt)
)
S0,t + v(ϕt)
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
ntSnt,t(zt)
−
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
C(nt; zt, ϕt)Snt,t(zt)− c(ϕt)
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
θnt+1,t(zt)Snt,t(zt)
+ φt
[
1−
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
ntSnt,t(zt)−
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
θnt+1,t(zt)Snt,t(zt)− S0,t
∑
zt∈Z
θ1,t(zt)
]
+ ψ0,t
[
δf
+∞∑
nt=1
∑
zt∈Z
Snt,t(zt) + δc
∑
zt∈Z
S1,t(zt)−
∑
ze∈Z
πz(z
e)η
(
θ1,t(z
e)
)
S0,t
]
+
∑
zt∈Z
{
ψ1,t(zt)
[
πz(zt)η
(
θ1,t(zt)
)
S0,t + 2δcS2,t(zt) +
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(zt|z˜)S1,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + δc + η
(
θ2,t(zt)
)
+
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(z˜|zt)
)
S1,t(zt)
]
+
+∞∑
nt=2
ψnt,t(zt)
[
η
(
θnt,t(zt)
)
Snt−1,t(zt) + (nt + 1)δcSnt+1,t(zt) +
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(zt|z˜)Snt,t(z˜)
−
(
δf + ntδc + η
(
θnt+1,t(zt)
)
+
∑
z˜ =zt
λz(z˜|zt)
)
Snt,t(zt)
]}
+ ϑtS0,t
where ψn,t(z) ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 (respectively, ψ0,t ≥ 0) is the co-state variable on the flow equation
for Sn,t(z) (respectively, S0,t); φt ≥ 0 is the multiplier on (C.2.5); and ϑt ≥ 0 is the multiplier on
the non-negative entry condition, where the corresponding complementary slackness hold. In vector
notation, the necessary conditions for optimality are:
∇ΘHt(Θt; St) = 0
∇SHt(Θt; St) = −∇tψt + rψt
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where ∇ denotes the gradient operator, and ψt is a stacked vector of co-state variables. These
conditions are also sufficient because the Hamiltonian is quasi-concave. Indeed, the objective function
is linear in both control and state variables, and because of Assumption 2 establishing concavity of
η, all the constraints are concave in the control and linear in the states.
Regarding the first set of optimality conditions, for given zt ∈ Z we have:
[θ1] : φt + c(ϕt) =
(
ψ1,t(zt)− ψ0,t
)
πz(zt)
∂η(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ1,t(zt)
(C.2.6a)
[θn : n ≥ 2] : φt + c(ϕt) =
(
ψnt,t(zt)− ψnt−1,t(zt)
)∂η(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θnt,t(zt)
(C.2.6b)
As for the second set of conditions, we have:
[S0] : −∂tψ0,t + rψ0,t = −κ(ϕt)−
(
φt + c(ϕt)
) ∑
zt∈Z
θ1(zt) (C.2.7a)
+
∑
ze∈Z
πz(z
e)η
(
θ1,t(z
e)
)
ψ1,t(z
e)− ψ0,t
∑
ze∈Z
πz(z
e)η
(
θ1,t(z
e)
)
+ ϑt
[Snt(zt)] : −∂tψnt,t(zt) + rψnt,t(zt) = nt
(
v(ϕt)− φt
)− (φt + c(ϕt))θnt+1,t(zt)− C(nt, zt;ϕt)
+ δf
(
ψ0,t − ψnt,t(zt)
)
+ ntδc
(
ψnt−1,t(zt)− ψnt,t(zt)
)
(C.2.7b)
+ η
(
θnt+1(zt)
)(
ψnt+1,t(zt)− ψnt,t(zt)
)
+
∑
z˜∈Z
λz(z˜|zt)
(
ψnt,t(z˜)− ψnt,t(zt)
)
for given zt ∈ Z, where in the last line we have used that λz(z|z) = −
∑
z˜ =z λz(z˜|z) for all z ∈ Z,
by the properties of the Markov chain.
We now show that a block-recursive equilibrium with non-negative entry of firms satisfies the
optimality conditions of the planner by appropriately choosing the co-state variables of the planning
problem. By equations (C.2.7a)-(C.2.7b), the co-state variables can be represented as HJB equations.
Equations (C.2.6a)-(C.2.6b) are the corresponding first order conditions of those equations. Therefore,
it suffices to find the values of the multipliers for which the HJB equations of the planner coincide
with the joint surplus problem of the decentralized allocation.
Pick a decentralized equilibrium allocation
{
Wn(z, ϕ), xn(z, ϕ), θn(z, ϕ), U
B(ϕ) : (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N ×
Z × Φ}, and consider the following realization for the multipliers:
φt(ϕ
t) = rUB(ϕt)
ψ0,t(ϕ
t) = 0
∀nt, zt : ψnt,t(zt, ϕt) = Wnt(zt, ϕt)− ntUB(ϕt)
Under this guess, notice that ∂tψ0,t = ∂tψn,t(zt) = 0, ∀n ≥ 1. Moreover, the multipliers depend
only on the current realization of the aggregate state, and not the entire history. Further, for a
sufficiently low value of κ, we can impose strictly positive entry and therefore ϑt = 0, ∀t.
Plugging these guesses into (C.2.7b), after some simple algebra we obtain:
(r + δf )Wnt(zt, ϕt) = nt
(
v(ϕt) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕt)
)
− C(nt, zt;ϕt)
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−
[(
rUB(ϕt) + c(ϕt)
)
θnt+1,t(zt) + η
(
θnt+1(zt)
)
UB(ϕt)
]
+ ntδc
(
Wnt−1(zt, ϕt)−Wnt(zt, ϕt)
)
+ η
(
θnt+1(zt)
)(
Wnt+1(zt, ϕt)−Wnt(zt, ϕt)
)
+
∑
z˜∈Z
λz(z˜|zt)
(
Wnt(z˜, ϕt)−Wnt(zt, ϕt)
)
The last equation resembles the maximized HJB equation for the joint surplus (equation (10))
except for the second line in square brackets. Using that η(θ) = θμ(θ) and xn+1(z, ϕ) = U
B(ϕ) +
rUB(ϕ)+c(ϕ)
μ(θn+1(z,ϕ))
by inactive buyers’ indifference, we obtain:
(
rUB(ϕt) + c(ϕt)
)
θnt+1,t(zt) + η
(
θnt+1(zt)
)
UB(ϕt) = η (θnt+1,t(zt, ϕt))xnt+1,t(zt, ϕt) (C.2.8)
Using this into the above equation and grouping terms, we will then recognize the value of the
joint surplus in the decentralized solution, equation (10).
Similarly, plugging the guess for the multipliers into (C.2.7a), we obtain:
κ(ϕt) = −
(
rUB(ϕt) + c(ϕt)
) ∑
zt∈Z
θ1(zt) +
∑
ze∈Z
πz(z
e)η
(
θ1,t(z
e)
)(
W1(z
e)− UB(ϕt)
)
A final manipulation using (C.2.8) again then allows us to obtain the free entry condition in the
decentralized allocation, equation (13).
Summing up, under an appropriate choice of the co-states, the planner’s solution is equivalent to
the problem of the decentralized economy. Hence, the equilibrium is constrained-efficient. 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3: Joint Surplus Solution
Proof. The equilibrium allocation is composed of sequences:
{
Wn(z, ϕ), xn(z, ϕ), θn(z, ϕ), pn(z, ϕ) : (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N×Z × Φ
}
satisfying equations (10), (11), and (15), where the free entry condition (13) pins down x1 and the
first-order condition (12) pins down xn given xn−1, n ≥ 2, for any ϕ ∈ Φ.
For μ(θ) = θγ−1, γ ∈ (0, 1), equation (11) defines the following equilibrium mapping:
θ : (x;ϕ) →
(
x− UB(ϕ)
ΓB(ϕ)
) 1
1−γ
(C.3.1)
Some algebra shows that equation (12) can be written as:
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)− xn+1(z, ϕ) = 1− γ
γ
(
xn+1(z, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
)
(C.3.2)
One can also write this condition as:
xn+1(z, ϕ)− UB(ϕ) = γ
(
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γn+1(z,ϕ)
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showing that the buyer absorbs a fraction γ of the marginal gains from matching, Γn+1(z, ϕ).
Next, define:
ΓSn(z, ϕ) ≡ (r + δf )Wn(z, ϕ)− πn(z, ϕ) + nδc
(
Wn(z, ϕ)−Wn−1(z, ϕ)
)
− n(δc + δf )UB(ϕ)− Ξn(z, ϕ)
(C.3.3)
where πn(z, ϕ) ≡ nv(ϕ)− C(n; z, ϕ) is the flow joint surplus, and:
Ξn(z, ϕ) ≡
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)Wn(z′, ϕ) +
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)Wn(z, ϕ′)
is the expected value of the joint surplus across exogenous states. Next, note:
ΓSn(z, ϕ) = η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)(
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)− xn+1(z, ϕ)
)
=
(
1− γ
γ
)
η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)(
xn+1(z, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
)
=
(
1− γ
γ
)
θn+1(z, ϕ)Γ
B(ϕ)
where the first line uses the HJB equation for the joint surplus (equation (10)), the second line
uses (C.3.2), and the third line uses (C.3.1) and η(θ) = θμ(θ). The right-hand side of the first equality
allows us to interpret ΓS as the expected match surplus for the seller (see main text).
Using the last equality, we have found the market tightness:
θn+1(z, ϕ) =
(
γ
1− γ
)
ΓSn(z, ϕ)
ΓB(ϕ)
(C.3.4)
for all n ≥ 1. Finally, we can write (C.3.2) as:
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ) = UB(ϕ) + 1
γ
(
xn+1(z, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
)
= UB(ϕ) +
1
γ
ΓB(ϕ)θn+1(z, ϕ)
1−γ
Using (C.3.4) and rearranging terms, we obtain our desired result:
Wn+1(z, ϕ) = Wn(z, ϕ) + U
B(ϕ) +
(
ΓB(ϕ)
γ
)γ (
ΓSn(z, ϕ)
1− γ
)1−γ
(C.3.5)
This is a second-order difference equation in n. The boundary conditions are W0 = 0 (as the joint
value is nil when the seller has no customers), and W1 set to satisfy the free entry condition (13). By
(C.3.2), we know that W1 − x1 = (1 − γ)(W1 − UB) and x1 − UB = γ(W1 − UB), and thus we can
write (13) as:
κ(ϕ) = (1− γ)
(
ΓB(ϕ)
γ
) γ
γ−1 ∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)
(
W1(z0, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
) 1
1−γ
our desired result. 
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 4: Invariant Distribution
Proof. Let
{
θn(z, ϕ) : (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N × Z × Φ
}
be an equilibrium collection of market tightness
levels, where N = {1, . . . , n}, and n < +∞ is a large integer. In matrix notation, for each aggregate
state ϕ ∈ Φ, equations (19)-(20)-(21) can be written succinctly as:
∂tSt(ϕ) = TϕSt(ϕ) (C.4.1)
where St(ϕ) ≡
(
S0,t(ϕ),S

1,t, . . . ,S

n,t
)
, with Sn,t ≡
(
Sn,t(z1), . . . , Sn,t(zkz )
)
, and Tϕ is the
partitioned matrix:
Tϕ ≡
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
t11 δ
e
f + δ
e
c δ
e
f δ
e
f · · · δef δef δef
ηe1(ϕ)
 D1(ϕ) δ2,c 0kz :kz · · · 0kz :kz 0kz :kz 0kz :kz
0kz :1 η2(ϕ) D2(ϕ) δ3,c · · · 0kz :kz 0kz :kz 0kz :kz
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0kz :1 0kz :kz 0kz :kz 0kz :kz · · · Dn−2(ϕ) δn−1,c 0kz :kz
0kz :1 0kz :kz 0kz :kz 0kz :kz · · · ηn−1(ϕ) Dn−1(ϕ) δn,c
0kz :1 0kz :kz 0kz :kz 0kz :kz · · · 0kz :kz ηn(ϕ) Dn(ϕ)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where t11 ≡ −
∑
z πz(z)η(θ1(z, ϕ)) is a scalar, 0p:q denotes a p × q matrix of zeros, and Tϕ is a
K ×K square matrix, where K = 1 + nkz. Further, we have defined the 1× kz row vectors:
δef ≡
(
δf , . . . , δf
)
; δec ≡
(
δc, . . . , δc
)
; ηe1(ϕ) ≡
(
πz(z1)η
(
θ1(z1, ϕ)
)
, . . . , πz(zkz )η
(
θ1(zkz , ϕ)
))
;
and the kz × kz matrices:
∀n = 2, . . . , n : δn,c ≡ diag
(
nδc, . . . , nδc
)
;
ηn(ϕ) ≡ diag
(
η
(
θn(z1, ϕ)
)
, . . . , η
(
θn(zkz , ϕ)
))
;
∀n = 1, . . . , n : Dn(ϕ) ≡
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dn(z1, ϕ) λz(z1|z2) . . . λz(z1|zkz )
λz(z2|z1) dn(z2, ϕ) . . . λz(z2|zkz )
...
...
. . .
...
λz(zkz |z1) λz(zkz |z2) . . . dn(zkz , ϕ)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where diag(.) denotes a diagonal matrix, and the diagonal elements of Dn(ϕ) are given by:
dn(zj , ϕ) ≡
⎧⎨⎩−
(
δf + nδc + η
(
θn+1(zj , ϕ)
)
+
∑
 =j λz(z|zj)
)
for n = 1, . . . , n− 1
−
(
δf + nδc +
∑
 =j λz(z|zj)
)
for n = n
System (C.4.1) describes an irreducible Markov chain, as any state (n′, z′) ∈ N ×Z can be reached
almost surely from some (n, z) = (n′, z′). Moreover, the Markov chain is aperiodic. These properties,
plus the fact that the state space is finite, guarantee that the Markov chain is ergodic. Therefore, by
Theorem 11.2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989), the system converges to a unique steady-state distribution
S∗(ϕ), for each ϕ ∈ Φ.
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For the analytical characterization, note that the transition matrix Tϕ is constant, so we can solve
the differential equation (C.4.1) directly. The solution is:
St(ϕ) = e
TϕtS0(ϕ)
where the initial distribution S0(ϕ) ∈ RK+ is given. To compute eTϕt, consider the eigen-
value decomposition Tϕ = EϕΛϕE
−1
ϕ , where Λϕ ≡
(
λ1(ϕ), . . . , λK(ϕ)
)
is the diagonal matrix of
eigenvalues, and Eϕ collects the corresponding eigenvectors. Defining Zt(ϕ) ≡ E−1ϕ St(ϕ), then
∂tZt(ϕ) = ΛϕZt(ϕ), and because Λϕ is a diagonal matrix, we can solve this differential equation
element-by-element, i.e. ∂tZi,t(ϕ) = λi(ϕ)Zi,t(ϕ) for each i = 1, . . . ,K. This is a simple system of
ODEs with solution:
Zi,t(ϕ) = cie
λi(ϕ)t, i = 1, . . . ,K
where ci ∈ R is the constant of integration. Since St(ϕ) = EϕZt(ϕ), we have obtained:
St(ϕ) =
K∑
i=1
cie
λi(ϕ)tvi (C.4.2)
where vi is the K × 1 eigenvector associated to the i-th eigenvalue. Therefore, the stability of
system (C.4.2) as t → +∞ depends on the sign of the eigenvalues of Tϕ. The trace of Tϕ is:
tr(Tϕ) =
K∑
i=1
λi(ϕ) = −
kz∑
j=1
πz(zj)η(θ1(zj , ϕ)) +
n∑
n=1
kz∑
j=1
dn(zj) < 0
The trace being unambiguously negative means that there is at least one negative eigenvalue, if not
more. Letting 1 ≤  ≤ K denote the number of negative eigenvalues, and re-ordering the eigenvalues
from small to large with no loss of generality, we can then impose cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {+ 1, + 2, . . . ,K},
on equation (C.4.2), and let t → +∞ to find the stable solution. That is:
S∗(ϕ) = lim
t→+∞
∑
j=1
cje
λj(ϕ)tvj ∈ RK+
is the unique invariant distribution of sellers in state ϕ ∈ Φ. 
D Model Extensions
D.1 Endogenous Customer Separations
To introduce customer seller-to-seller transitions, we can model customer search explicitly. While
we assume that there is still an exogenous risk δc > 0 of separation for each customer, additionally we
now add the possibility that customers search, and potentially endogenously separate, while on the
match. We assume that active buyers do not face a cost of search, as they do not discontinue their
consumption when transitioning from one seller to the another.
Introducing this additional dimension into our full model with aggregate shocks is not at all
straightforward. Endogenous buyer transitions across sellers would break the ex-ante indifference
condition among inactive buyers, which in our baseline setting is key to pin down equilibrium market
tightness. In order to preserve the block-recursive structure, one remedy would be to assume free
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 67 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1838
entry across all markets on the seller side. This would change the environment substantially, so we
leave it for future work.
Thus, suppose there are no aggregate shocks. The problem of an active buyer with value V B is:
max
x∈[V B ,x]
μ(θ(x))
(
x− V B)
Note that the matched buyer only considers offers that deliver an expected value that weakly
dominates the current perceived utility, V B . Let x̂(n,ω; z) be the policy for a customer in a firm of
type (n, z) under contract ω. The first-order condition reads:
(
x̂(n,ω; z)− V B(n,ω; z)
)∂μ(θ(x))
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=x̂(n,ω;z)
= −μ
(
θ
(
x̂(n,ω; z)
))
(D.1.1)
Intuitively, the inactive buyer trades off the expected option value of transitioning (left-hand side)
to the rate at which this offer can be obtained (right-hand side). Since we focus on equilibria in which
market tightness is an increasing function of promised utilities, it is not difficult to show (e.g. Shi
(2009)) that x̂(n,ω; z) is increasing in V B(n,ω; z). In words, the more profitable a match is ex-post,
the higher the offer for which the customer will apply next. Therefore, customers separate according
to their initial state, and climb up the utility ladder. This effect tends to shift the mass of customers
(and therefore sellers) toward higher promised utilities, and thus acts as a countervailing force to the
equilibrium dynamics of the baseline model: when the sellers offering the worst terms of trade lose
customers, they need to start setting up more favorable contracts.
The risk of endogenously losing customers must now be incorporated into the pricing decisions of
sellers. The buyers’ and seller’s HJB equations are then identical to (5) and (6), respectively, except
that we now must replace δc by an “effective” customer separation rate, given by:
δ̂c(n,ω; z) ≡ δc + μ
(
θ
(
x̂(n,ω; z)
))
Likewise, the market tightness must incorporate that the pool of searching buyers is composed of
both inactive as well as active buyers:
θn(z) =
1
Sn−1(z)
(
BIn(z) +B
A
ι(n)(z)
)
for any n ≥ 1, where ι(n) ∈ N is the size of the seller that a customer seeking to transition to a
size-n seller is currently matched with, i.e. the solution to xn(z) = x̂(ι(n),ω; z).
D.2 Price Discrimination
The assumption of no price discrimination across different customers is not key to generate efficient
firm dynamics. We argue that:
• So long as we maintain the assumption of dynamic contracts with commitment, our model still
generates these dynamics as well as cross-sectional price dispersion.
• Allowing for price discrimination leads to equilibrium indeterminacy.
If sellers were to use prices as their only instrument for customer attraction (instead of recur-
sive contracts with price-utility pairs), an equilibrium with price discrimination across customers of
different tenures would look similar to that of Gourio and Rudanko (2014b): firms would attract
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customers by offering an instantaneous discount on the valuation v, and extract all surplus by charg-
ing v immediately after the customer joins the seller, and until separation. However, assuming price
discrimination in our model does not yield this result. This is because sellers must still trade off static
payoffs coming from the current price with dynamic ones coming from the promised utilities.
Importantly, under price discrimination, tractability is preserved along several dimensions:
(i.) The seller’s and the join surplus problem are equivalent;
(ii.) The joint surplus is constant in the distribution of contracts across customers;
(iii.) As a novelty, there is equilibrium price indeterminacy.
Let us discuss these results more formally. First, we must extend our baseline framework to
allow for discrimination across buyers. Let ωi =
{
pi,x
′
i(n
′; s′)
}
be the contract offered to the typical
customer i = 1, . . . , n, which is composed of an individual-specific price level pi, and a personalized
menu of continuation utilities x′i(n
′; s′), one for each n′ ∈ {n− 1, n, n+ 1} and s′ ∈ {(z′, ϕ), (z, ϕ′)}.
A seller is characterized by the collection {xi}ni=1 of outstanding promises, and must choose: (i) a
menu of contracts {ωi}ni=1 for the n current customers; and (ii) a starting promised utility x′0 ∈ R for
the new incoming customer (if there is any).
The HJB equation for the seller now reads:
rV S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
= max
x′0,{ωi}ni=1
{
n∑
i=1
pi − C(n; z, ϕ) + δf
(
V S0 (ϕ)− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+ δc
n∑
j=1
(
V S
(
n− 1,{x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)}ni=1\−{x′j(n− 1; z, ϕ)}; z, ϕ)− V S(n,{xi}ni=1; z, ϕ))
+ η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)(
V S
(
n+ 1,
{
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)
}n
i=1
∪+
{
x′0
}
; z, ϕ
)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)
}n
i=1
; z′, ϕ
)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ′
)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))}
where \− and ∪+ are multiset difference and union operators.43 The most important differences
relative to the baseline model (equation (6)) have been highlighted in blue. Note that, now, when
a customer i = 1, . . . , n separates, the vector of promised utilities shrinks in cardinality and the
customers that remain obtain the new promise x′i(n−1; z, ϕ). The firm attracts new buyers by offering
a starting utility x′0 to the entering customer, while delivering the promised level x
′
i(n + 1; z, ϕ) to
each of the remaining n customers. The promise-keeping constraint now reads:
∀i = 1, . . . , n : xi ≤ V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
for all (z, ϕ) ∈ Z × Φ, establishing that the firm commits to each and every customer. We then
solve for the optimal menu of contracts by solving for the joint surplus problem:
Lemma 1 (Joint Surplus Equivalence under Price Discrimination) In the economy with price
discrimination, the seller’s and the joint surplus problems are equivalent:
43 These operators are defined by {a, b, b}\−{b} = {a, b} and {a, b}∪+ {b} = {a, b, b}, and they are needed here
because the vector of promised utilities may contain more than one instance of the same element.
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(i) Given a menu of contracts ωi =
{
pi,x
′
i(n
′; s′)
}
for i = 1, . . . , n that maximize the seller’s value
subject to the promise-keeping constraint,
{
x′i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
maximizes:
W
(
n, {xi}ni=1; z, ϕ
) ≡ V S(n, {xi}ni=1; z, ϕ)+ n∑
i=1
xi;
(ii) Conversely, for every
{
x′i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
that maximizes W
(
n, {xi}ni=1; z, ϕ
)
, there exists a menu of
personalized price levels
{
pi
}n
i=1
such that the collection
{
pi,x
′
i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
constitutes a solution
to the seller’s problem.
Proof. The argument is conceptually similar to that of the baseline model (see Appendix C.1).
Let
{
x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
}
be a generic policy for the firm, with ωi ≡
{
pi,x
′
i(n
′; s′)
}
and x′i(n
′; s′) =
{
x′i(n+
1; z, ϕ), x′i(n − 1; z, ϕ), {x′i(n; z′, ϕ) : z′ ∈ Z}, {x′i(n; z, ϕ′) : ϕ′ ∈ Φ}
}
, for i = 1, . . . , n. The firm’s
problem can be written as:
V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
≡ max
x′0,{ωi}ni=1
V˜ S
(
n;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
s.t. xi ≤ V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ), ∀i = 1, . . . , n
where:
V˜ S
(
n;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
≡ 1
ρ(n; z, ϕ)
[
n∑
i=1
pi − C(n; z, ϕ) (D.2.1)
+ δc
n∑
j=1
V S
(
n− 1,{x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)}ni=1\−{x′j(n− 1; z, ϕ)}; z, ϕ)
+ η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)
V S
(
n+ 1,
{
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)
}n
i=1
∪+
{
x′0
}
; z, ϕ
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)
}n
i=1
; z′, ϕ
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ′
)]
is the value of the seller, with ρ(n; z, ϕ) ≡ r + δf + nδc + η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)
being the effective discount
rate. The value of buyer i = 1, . . . , n under this policy is:
rV B(n,ωi; z, ϕ) = v(ϕ)− pi + (δf + δc)
(
UB(ϕ)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
+ (n− 1)δc
(
x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
+ η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)(
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
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xi = V
B(n,ωi; z, ϕ), ∀i = 1, . . . , n
From this equation, we can solve for the promise-compatible price level to be charged to each
customer under the policy
{
x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
}
:
pPKi
({
x′0, {x′j(n′; s′)}nj=1
})
= v(ϕ)− ρ(n; z, ϕ)xi + δfUB(ϕ) (D.2.2)
+ δc
(
UB(ϕ) + (n− 1)x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)
)
+ η
(
θ(x′0);ϕ
)
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)x′i(n; z′, ϕ) +
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)x′i(n; z, ϕ′)
Importantly, note that the price level for a specific customer i is independent of the distribution
of utilities for all the other customers, that is:
pPKi
({
x′0, {x′j(n′; s′)}j =i
} ∪+ {x′i(n′; s′)}) = pPKi ({x′0, {x′φ(j)(n′; s′)}φ(j) =i} ∪+ {x′i(n′; s′)})
for any arbitrary bisection φ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, since the firm’s problem
internalizes the price level, the resulting maximization should be independent of the distribution of
utilities. Indeed, plugging (D.2.2) into (D.2.1) and rearranging terms yields:
W˜
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
;z, ϕ
)
≡ 1
ρ(n; z, ϕ)
[
n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕ)
)
(D.2.3)
−
(
C(n; z, ϕ) + η(θ(x′0;ϕ)) n∑
i=1
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)
)
+ δc
n∑
j=1
W
(
n− 1,{x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)}ni=1\−{x′j(n− 1; z, ϕ)}; z, ϕ)
+ η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)
W
(
n+ 1,
{
x′i(n+ 1)
}n
i=1
∪+
{
x′0
}
; z, ϕ
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)W
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)
}n
i=1
; z′, ϕ
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)W
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ′
)]
where we have defined:
W˜
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
≡ V˜ S
(
n;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
+
n∑
i=1
xi
and:
W
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
≡ max
x′0,{ωi}ni=1
W˜
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
as the joint surplus under policy
{
x′0, {ωi}ni=1
}
, and the maximized joint surplus, respectively.
Notice that the firm is re-optimizing after changing size. By monotonicity of preferences, the
promise-keeping constraint will bind for each customer:
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Finally, noting that the right-hand side of (D.2.3) does not depend on the initial distribution of
utilities {xi}ni=1 nor the price level, we can write the joint surplus under a given policy as:
W˜
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
;x′0,
{
ωi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
= W˜n
(
x′0,
{
x′i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
This allows us to break up the optimal contracting problem into two separate stages. Where{
x′∗0 , {p∗i ,x′∗i (n′; s′)}ni=1
}
denotes an optimal contract, we have:
{
x′∗0 , {x′∗i (n′; s′)}ni=1
}
= argmax W˜n
(
x′0,
{
x′i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
p∗i = p
PK
i
({
x′∗0 , {x′∗j (n′; s′)}nj=1
})
, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
Thus, the joint surplus and the seller’s problems are equivalent. 
The characterization of the equilibrium is also similar to the baseline model. First, by utility-
invariance of the joint surplus we can write:
∀(n, z, ϕ) ∈ N×Z × Φ : Wn(z, ϕ) = W
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
(D.2.4)
Letting
{
x′0, {x′i,n+1(z, ϕ)}ni=1
}
be the set of optimal policies, the joint surplus solves the second-
order difference equation:
(r + δf )Wn(z, ϕ) =nv(ϕ)− C(n; z, ϕ) + n(δf + δc)UB(ϕ)
+ η
(
θ(x′0;ϕ)
)(
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)−
n∑
i=1
x′i,n+1(z, ϕ)
)
+ nδc
(
Wn−1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
Wn(z
′, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
Wn(z, ϕ
′)−Wn(z, ϕ)
)
Thus, only the aggregate utility
∑n
i=1 x
′
i,n+1(z, ϕ) is relevant from a joint-surplus perspective, so
there is now a multiplicity of contracts that can be sustained in the optimal allocation.44 This is
stated formally in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Price Indeterminacy) There is a continuum of joint-surplus-maximizing contracts
{
p∗i ,x
′∗
i (n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
that leave both the buyers and the seller indifferent.
Proof. Pick ε ∈ R arbitrarily. The goal of the proof is to show that there is some βn(ϕ) > 0
(possibly a function of size and the aggregate state) for which, if a given contract with ωb =
{
pi +
εβn(ϕ),x
′
i(n
′; s′) + ε
}n
i=1
is optimal, then each customer and the seller maximize their value under
contract ωa =
{
pi,x
′
i(n
′; s′)
}n
i=1
. The value of contract ωbi for customer i = 1, . . . , n is:
rV B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ) = v(ϕ)− pi − εβn(ϕ) + (δf + δc)
(
UB(ϕ)− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
44Additional equilibria may exist in non-Markovian environments. Here we only point out that equilibrium
uniqueness is lost in Markov Perfect equilibria when sellers can discriminate.
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+ (n− 1)δc
(
x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ) + ε− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+ η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
)(
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ) + ε− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ) + ε− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′) + ε− V B(n,ωi; z, ϕ)
)
= v(ϕ)− pi − ε
(
βn(ϕ)− (n− 1)δc − η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
))
+ (δf + δc)
(
UB(ϕ)− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+ (n− 1)δc
(
x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+ η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
)(
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)− V B(n,ωbi ; z, ϕ)
)
= rV B(n,ωai ; z, ϕ) + ε
(
βn(ϕ)− (n− 1)δc − η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
))
Thus, V B(n,ωai ) = V
B(n,ωbi ) if, and only if:
βn(ϕ) = (n− 1)δc + η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
)
(D.2.5)
As for the seller’s value, note that:
rV S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
= max
x′0(ϕ),{ωi}ni=1
{
n∑
i=1
pi + nεβn(ϕ)− C(n; z, ϕ)
+ δf
(
V S0 (ϕ)− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+ δc
n∑
j=1
(
V S
(
n− 1,{x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ) + ε}ni=1\−{x′j(n− 1; z, ϕ) + ε}; z, ϕ)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+ η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
)(
V S
(
n+ 1,
{
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ) + ε
}n
i=1
∪+
{
x′0(ϕ)
}
; z, ϕ
)
− V S
(
n, {xi}ni=1; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ) + ε
}n
i=1
; z′, ϕ
)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
V S
(
n,
{
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′) + ε
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ′
)
− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))}
= max
x′0(ϕ),{ωi}ni=1
{
n∑
i=1
pi + nεβn(ϕ)− C(n; z, ϕ) + δf
(
V S0 (ϕ)− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+ δc
n∑
j=1
(
Wn−1(z, ϕ)−
∑
i =j
x′i(n− 1; z, ϕ)− (n− 1)ε− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
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+ η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
)(
Wn+1(z, ϕ)−
n∑
i=1
x′i(n+ 1; z, ϕ)− x′0 − nε
− V S
(
n, {xi}ni=1; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
Wn(z
′, ϕ)−
n∑
i=1
x′i(n; z
′, ϕ)− nε− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
Wn(z, ϕ
′)−
n∑
i=1
x′i(n; z, ϕ
′)− nε− V S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
))}
= rV S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
+ nε
(
βn(ϕ)− (n− 1)δc − η
(
θ(x′0(ϕ);ϕ)
))
= rV S
(
n,
{
xi
}n
i=1
; z, ϕ
)
where we have used the definition of W in the second equality, and equation (D.2.5) in the last
one. In sum, contract {ωai }ni=1 is optimal if, and only if, {ωbi }ni=1 is optimal. Generally, these is a
continuum of optimal contracts, indexed by ε. 
E Numerical Appendix
E.1 Numerical Implementation of the Exogenous Processes
This appendix shows how to parametrize and estimate (z, ϕ) as continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC) processes. The same identical structure applies to both shocks, so let us consider for instance
the idiosyncratic shock (z).
The kz × kz infinitesimal generator matrix Λz to be estimated is:
Λz =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−∑j =1 λ1j λ12 . . . λ1kz
λ21 −
∑
j =2 λ2j . . . λ2kz
...
...
. . .
...
λkz1 λkz2 . . . −
∑
j =kz λkzj
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where λij is short-hand for λz(zj |zi), zi, zj ∈ Z. Since this level of generality would require
the estimation of a large number kz(kz − 1) of transition rates, we reduce the parameter space by
specializing the CTMC as follows:
• First, we assume z follows a driftless Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process in logs. An OU process
is a type of mean-reverting and autoregressive CTMC which can be loosely viewed as the
continuous-time analogue of an AR(1). Formally:
d log zt = −ρz log ztdt+ σzdBt
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, and ρz, σz > 0 are parameters.
• Operationally, in the numerical version of the model in which time is partitioned and takes
values in T = {Δ, 2Δ, 3Δ, . . . }, we use the Euler-Maruyama method, that is:
log zk = (1− ρzΔ) log zk−1 + σz
√
Δεzk, ε
z
k ∼ iid N (0, 1) (E.1)
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for each k ∈ T. This is now an AR(1) processes with autocorrelation ρ˜z ≡ 1−ρzΔ and variance
σ2z
ρz(1 + ρ˜z)
. Thus, ρz > 0 can be seen as a measure of mean-reversion, with lower values
corresponding to higher persistence.
• The discrete-time process (E.1) is estimated using the Tauchen (1986) with a discrete-state
Markov chain that we define on the theoretical grid, Z. The outcome of this method are
estimates for (ρz, σz), and a transition probability matrix Πz =
(
πij
)
, where πij denotes the
probability of a zi-to-zj transition in the T space.
• For the mapping back into continuous time, we use the fact that, for small enough Δ > 0,
transition probabilities are well approximated by transition rates in the following sense:
∀i = 1, . . . , kz : πij ≈ λijΔ, ∀j = i and πii ≈ 1−
∑
j =i
λijΔ
• First, we solve the maximization of the joint surplus function using a value function iteration
(VFI) algorithm, under a guess for UB .
• To update UB , we must check that the free entry condition is satisfied. Combining equations
(3) and (13), we can write the equilibrium free entry condition as:
κ(ϕ) =
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)
{
η ◦ μ−1
(
ΓB(ϕ)
x′1(z0, ϕ)− UB(ϕ)
)(
W1(z0, ϕ)− x′1(z0, ϕ)
)}
To find UB , we use a bisection method: increase (or decrease) UB if there are too many (or too
few) entering firms.
Throughout, the state space grid is fixed at N ×Z ×Φ, where N = {1, . . . , n¯}, Z = {zi}kzi=1, and
Φ = {ϕj}kϕj=1. The following describes the steps of the algorithm:
Step 1. Set the counter to k = 0. Choose guesses U (0)(ϕ) and U
(0)
(ϕ)  U (0)(ϕ) for each
ϕ ∈ Φ. Set the value of inactivity to:
UB(0)(ϕ) =
1
2
(
U (0)(ϕ) + U
(0)
(ϕ)
)
Step 2. For any given k ∈ N and n ∈ N , use VFI to find the fixed point W (k)n (z, ϕ) of:
E.2 Stationary Solution Algorithm
To solve for the stationary equilibrium, we implement the following nested procedure:
(r + δf )W
(k)
n (z, ϕ) = n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(k)(ϕ)
)
− C(n; z, ϕ)
+ nδc
(
W
(k)
n−1(z, ϕ)−W (k)n (z, ϕ)
)
+max
x′n+1
{
η ◦ μ−1
(
ΓB(k)(ϕ)
x′n+1(z, ϕ)− UB(k)(ϕ)
)(
W
(k)
n+1(z, ϕ)−W (k)n (z, ϕ)− x′n+1
)}
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
W (k)n (z
′, ϕ)−W (k)n (z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
W (k)n (z, ϕ
′)−W (k)n (z, ϕ)
)
where ΓB(k) = c(ϕ) + rUB(k)(ϕ) −∑ϕ′∈Φ λϕ(ϕ′|ϕ)(UB(k)(ϕ′) − UB(k)(ϕ)). Store
the corresponding policy functions:
{
x
′(k)
n+1(z, ϕ) : (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N × Z × Φ
}
.
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Step 3. For each ϕ ∈ Φ, compute the object:
Δ(k)(ϕ) ≡ κ(ϕ)−
∑
z0∈Z
πz(z0)
{
η ◦ μ−1
(
ΓB(k)(ϕ)
x
′(k)
1 (z0, ϕ)− UB(k)(ϕ)
)(
W
(k)
1 (z0, ϕ)− x′(k)1 (z0, ϕ)
)}
Stop if Δ(k)(ϕ) ∈ [−ε, ε], ∀ϕ ∈ Φ, for some small ε > 0. Otherwise, set:
UB(k+1)(ϕ) =
1
2
(
U (k+1)(ϕ) + U
(k+1)
(ϕ)
)
for each ϕ ∈ Φ, where:
(a) If Δ(k)(ϕ) > ε, then U (k+1)(ϕ) = U (k)(ϕ) and U
(k+1)
(ϕ) = UB(k)(ϕ);
(b) If Δ(k)(ϕ) < −ε, then U (k+1)(ϕ) = UB(k)(ϕ) and U (k+1)(ϕ) = U (k)(ϕ);
and go back to Step 2. with [k] ← [k + 1].
The VFI algorithm of Step 2 is guaranteed to converge because, given a UB , the joint surplus is
a contraction and therefore has a unique fixed point. (For a proof, see Appendix F.3).
F Additional Theoretical Results
F.1 Aggregate Stationary Measures of Agents
To derive aggregate measures, we first must derive the equilibrium shares of agent types. Through-
out, we fix ϕ ∈ Φ. Let gn,t(z) ≡ Sn,t(z)St , where St ≡
∑
n≥1
∑
z Sn,t(z) is the total measure of
incumbents. After a period of size Δ > 0, the share of firms of size n ≥ 2 becomes:
gn,t+Δ(z) =
[
η
(
θn,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
Δ+ o(Δ)
]
gn−1,t(z) + (n+ 1)
[
δcΔ+ o(Δ)
]
gn+1,t(z) (F.1)
+
∑
z˜ =z
[
λz(z|z˜)Δ + o(Δ)
]
gn,t(z˜)
+
[
1− δfΔ− nδcΔ− η
(
θn+1,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
Δ−
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)Δ + o(Δ)
]
gn,t(z)
Subtracting gn,t(z) from both sides of equation (F.1) and dividing by Δ gives:
gn,t+Δ(z)− gn,t(z)
Δ
=
[
η
(
θn,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
+
o(Δ)
Δ
]
gn−1,t(z) + (n+ 1)
[
δc +
o(Δ)
Δ
]
gn+1,t(z)
+
∑
z˜ =z
[
λz(z|z˜) + o(Δ)
Δ
]
gn,t(z˜)
−
[
δf + nδc + η
(
θn+1,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z) + o(Δ)
Δ
]
gn,t(z)
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Taking the limit as Δ → 0:
∂tgn,t(z) =η
(
θn,t(z, ϕ)
)
gn−1,t(z) + (n+ 1)δcgn+1,t(z)
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z|z˜)gn,t(z˜)−
(
δf + nδc + η
(
θn+1,t(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)
)
gn,t(z)
Similarly, when n = 1 we have:
g1,t+Δ(z) =
[
πz(z)η
(
θ1,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
Δ+ o(Δ)
]S0,t(ϕ)
St + 2
[
δcΔ+ o(Δ)
]
g2,t(z) (F.2)
+
∑
z˜ =z
[
λz(z|z˜)Δ + o(Δ)
]
g1,t(z˜)
+
[
1− δfΔ− δcΔ− η
(
θ2,t+Δ(z, ϕ)
)
Δ−
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)Δ + o(Δ)
]
g1,t(z)
A similar derivation on (F.2) shows that, for n = 1,
∂tg1,t(z) =πz(z)η
(
θ1,t(z, ϕ)
)S0,t(ϕ)
St + 2δcg2,t(z)
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z|z˜)g1,t(z˜)−
(
δf + δc + η
(
θ2,t(z, ϕ)
)
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)
)
g1,t(z)
It remains to show the law of motion for the measure of potential entrants, S0,t(ϕ). In this case,
for given ϕ, we have:
S0,t+Δ(ϕ) =
[
δfΔ+ o(Δ)
]
St +
[
δcΔ+ o(Δ)
]∑
z
S1,t(z)
+
[
1−
∑
z0
πz(z0)η
(
θ1,t+Δ(z0, ϕ)
)
Δ+ o(Δ)
]
S0,t(ϕ)
Taking the continuous-time limit in the usual way, we arrive at:
∂tS0,t(ϕ) =
(
δf + δc
∑
z
g1,t(z)
)
St −
∑
z0
πz(z0)η
(
θ1,t(z0, ϕ)
)
S0,t(ϕ)
In the stationary solution, ∂tgn,t(z) = 0 and ∂tS0,t(ϕ) = 0. Then, we obtain a system of second-
order equations which can be solved numerically on the state-space grid, N × Z × Φ. This will
yield a solution for the matrix {gn(z)}n,z, and the share of potential entrants per incumbent firm,
h0(ϕ) ≡ S0(ϕ)/S.
To compute aggregates, use (17) to obtain bAn (z) ≡ B
A
n (z)
S by:
bAn (z) = ngn(z)
Then, bA ≡ BA/S = ∑+∞n=1∑z ngn(z). On the other hand, from equation (16) we know that
BIn(z, ϕ) = Sθn(z, ϕ)gn−1(z). Therefore, adding across n ≥ 2 yields:
S
+∞∑
n=2
∑
z
θn(z, ϕ)gn−1(z) =
+∞∑
n=2
∑
z
BIn(z, ϕ) = B
I −
∑
z
BI1(z, ϕ) = 1−BA −
∑
z
θ1(z, ϕ)S0(ϕ)
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Using the definitions above, we can then write:
S =
1−
(
bA + h0(ϕ)
∑
z θ1(z, ϕ)
)
S∑
n≥2
∑
z θn(z, ϕ)gn−1(z)
Solving for S, we obtain the stationary measure of active sellers:
S =
(
bA + h0(ϕ)
∑
z
θ1(z, ϕ) +
+∞∑
n=1
∑
z
θn+1(z, ϕ)gn(z)
)−1
Finally, the mass of potential entrants is S0(ϕ) = Sh0(ϕ), the measure of incumbent sellers is
Sn = Sgn, the measure of active buyers is BA = SbA, and that of inactive buyers is BI = 1−BA.
F.2 Invariant Distribution (Special Case)
Assume an environment without exogenous (z, ϕ) shocks, and let σn = Sn/(S0 + S), for n =
0, 1, 2, . . . Then, when δf = 0, we can re-write the flow equations in steady state as:
η(θn)σn−1 + (n+ 1)δcσn+1 −
(
η(θn+1) + nδc
)
σn = 0
for any n ≥ 1, and δcσ1 − η(θ1)σ0 = 0. Since
∑+∞
n=0 σn = 1 by construction, {σn} follows a
stationary birth-death process, with Markov transition rates η(θn+1) and nδc for transitions n →
(n+ 1) and n → (n− 1), respectively. Solving for n ≥ 1 recursively, we find:
σn =
1
n!
∏n−1
i=0 η(θi+1)
(δc)n
σ0 (F.1)
Imposing that
∑+∞
n=0 σn = 1 in equation (F.1) yields:
σ0 =
(
1 +
+∞∑
n=1
1
n!
∏n−1
i=0 η(θi+1)
(δc)n
)−1
(F.2)
F.3 Existence of the Joint Surplus Function, given UB
This section shows that there exists a unique joint surplus W , for each given UB . First, we define
the relevant functional space. Recall that the state space isN×Z×Φ = {1, . . . , n¯}×{zi}kzi=1×{ϕj}kϕj=1.
Under necessary condition (F.3), the stationary solution of the birth-death process {σn} is given
by (F.1)-(F.2). Using that gn = σn(1 + S0/S) for n ≥ 1, and S0/S = σ0/(1− σ0), we then have:
gn =
S0
S
1
n!
∏n−1
i=0 η(θi+1)
(δc)n
, with
S0
S =
[
+∞∑
n=1
1
n!
∏n−1
i=0 η(θi+1)
(δc)n
]−1
From the last expression, it is clear that {σn} admits an ergodic representation if, and only if:
+∞∑
n=1
1
n!
∏n−1
i=0 η(θi+1)
(δc)n
< +∞ (F.3)
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Definition 2 Let W be a closed and bounded subspace of vector-valued functions W : N×Z×Φ → R,
with the following properties:
1. Increasing in n, i.e. Wn+1(z, ϕ) > Wn(z, ϕ), ∀n ∈ N .
2. Constant at the upper bound of N , i.e. Wn(z, ϕ) = Wn+1(z, ϕ).
For a given UB , the joint surplus can be written as follows:
where we have used the short-hand notation ψ(x;ϕ) ≡ η ◦ μ−1
(
ΓB(ϕ)
x−UB(ϕ)
)
. Equation (F.1) is a
continuous-time recursive problem. In order to use dynamic programming methods, we first transform
it into a form that can be exploited in Blackwell’s Theorem. We do this by a so-called uniformization
method.45 The objective is to construct a set of transition probabilities that mimic those of the
continuous-time specification.
For a given vector of current states γ ≡ (n, z, ϕ), define Γ′ ≡ {0, n− 1, n+ 1} × Z × Φ as the set
of possible future states. Let ζ ≡ {x′(n′, z′, ϕ′) : (n′, z′, ϕ′) ∈ Γ′} ⊆ X denote a set of policies. Let
Pγ,γ′(ζ) denote the probability of a γ-to-γ′ transition under policy ζ. Finally, let qγ(ζ) be the vector
of Markov transition rates for a fixed γ. Then, we have:
Pγ,γ′(ζ) ≡ 1
qγ(ζ)
·
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψ
(
x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ);ϕ
)
for γ′ = (n+ 1, z, ϕ)
nδc for γ
′ = (n− 1, z, ϕ)
δf for γ
′ = (0, z, ϕ)
λz(z
′|z) for γ′ = (n, z′, ϕ), any z′ = z
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ) for γ′ = (n, z, ϕ′), any ϕ′ = ϕ
and
qγ(ζ) ≡ ψ
(
x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ);ϕ
)
+ nδc + δf +
∑
z′ =z
λz(z
′|z) +
∑
ϕ′ =ϕ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
Since the state space is bounded, there exists a qS < +∞ for which qγ(ζ) < qS , for all states γ,
given ζ. Therefore, we can think of transitions actually occurring at rate q, with a fraction qγ(ζ)/q of
them being actual transitions out of state γ, and the remainder being “fictitious” transitions. Thus,
the Markov chain can be represented by the following transition probabilities, including transitions
across different states as well as from each state into itself:
P˜γ,γ′(ζ) ≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
qγ(ζ)
q
Pγ,γ′(ζ) for γ′ = γ
1− qγ(ζ)
q
otherwise
45 See Ross (1996), Section 5.8. For an application in economics, see Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012).
(r + δf )Wn(z, ϕ) = max
x′(n′,z′,ϕ′)
{
n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕ)
)
−
(
C(n; z, ϕ) + ψ
(
x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ);ϕ
)
x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ)
)
+ nδc
(
Wn−1
(
z, ϕ
)−Wn(z, ϕ))+ ψ(x′(n+ 1; z, ϕ);ϕ)(Wn+1(z, ϕ)−Wn(z, ϕ))
+
∑
z′∈Z
λz(z
′|z)
(
Wn
(
z′, ϕ
)−Wn(z, ϕ))+ ∑
ϕ′∈Φ
λϕ(ϕ
′|ϕ)
(
Wn
(
z, ϕ′
)−Wn(z, ϕ))
}
(F.1)
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Finally, define the corresponding discount factor as β ≡ qr+q , and the per-period payoff function
in state (n, z, ϕ) as:
Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζ) ≡ 1
q
[
n
(
v(ϕ) + (δf + δc)U
B(ϕ)
)
−
(
C(n; z, ϕ) + ψ(x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ);ϕ)x′(n+ 1, z, ϕ))]
We can now state the dynamic optimization problem (F.1) in discretized form:
Wn(z, ϕ) = max
ζ⊆X
{
Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζ) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζ)Wn′(z′, ϕ′)
}
(F.2)
We are now ready to prove the main result:
Lemma 3 For any (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N ×Z ×Φ, the joint surplus problem (F.1) admits a unique solution.
That is, the mapping T : W → W defined by:
T.Wn(z, ϕ) = max
ζ⊆X
{
Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζ) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζ)Wn′(z′, ϕ′)
}
has a fixed point T.Wn(z, ϕ) = Wn(z, ϕ).
Proof. T is a well-defined mapping from W to W. We want to show that it defines a contraction.
Since W is closed and ζ takes values in a compact set, the contraction property will be enough to
invoke Banach’s Fixed Point theorem. Hence, we check that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting.
• Monotonicity: Take Wa,Wb ∈ W such that W an (z, ϕ) ≤ W bn(z, ϕ), ∀(n, z, ϕ) ∈ N × Z × Φ.
Denote the corresponding optimal policies by:
ζˆi ≡ argmax
ζ
{
Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζ) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζ)W in′(z′, ϕ′)
}
for each i = a, b. Then:
T.W bn(z, ϕ) ≥ Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζˆa) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζˆa)W bn′(z′, ϕ′)
≥ Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζˆa) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζˆa)W an′(z′, ϕ′)
= T.W an (z, ϕ)
for any (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N × Z × Φ, where the first inequality follows by optimality, and the second
one follows from Wa ≤ Wb.
• Discounting: Let a ≥ 0 and W ∈ W, and denote the optimal policy by ζˆ. Since a is a
constant, we have that:
T.
[
W + a
]
n
(z, ϕ) = Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζˆ) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζˆ)
(
Wn′(z
′, ϕ′) + a
)
= Π˜n(z, ϕ; ζˆ) + β
∑
γ′∈Γ′
P˜γ,γ′(ζˆ)Wn′(z′, ϕ′) + aβ
= T.Wn(z, ϕ) + aβ
for any (n, z, ϕ) ∈ N × Z × Φ. Since β < 1, discounting obtains.
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Therefore, for a given UB , T defines a contraction in W with modulus β, and by Banach’s fixed-
point theorem there exists a unique value function Wn(z, ϕ) such that T.Wn(z, ϕ) = Wn(z, ϕ). 
G Conditional and Aggregate Price Statistics
This section shows how to calculate, using the model’s stationary solution, the conditional and
aggregate price statistics that we use in the validation exercise.
Consider a price spell whose starting date is normalized to t = 0 and which lasts until some
unknown time t ≥ 0. Let T denote the total duration of the price spell, and let F : R+ → [0, 1] be
the c.d.f. of T . We define the survival function associated to duration T as STt ≡ Pr[T ≥ t] = 1−Ft.
The probability that the price spell will end in the [t, t+Δ] interval is:
Pr[t < T ≤ t+Δ] = STt − STt+Δ
The hazard function is defined as Pr[t < T ≤ t + Δ|T > t]. Using Bayes’ rule, we can write
the hazard function in terms of the survival function as follows: Pr[t < T ≤ t + Δ|T > t] =
1 − STt+Δ
/STt . The instantaneous hazard rate is then defined by the continuous-time limit, ht ≡
limΔ↘0 1Δ
(
1− STt+Δ
/STt ). Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule:
ht = −∂t logSTt (G.1)
Hence, defining the cumulative hazard as Ht ≡
∫ t
0
hsds, the cumulative hazard and the survival
functions are related by STt = exp {−Ht} (as ST0 = 1−H0 = 1). Using this result, we can write:
Pr[t < T ≤ t+Δ|T > t] = 1− exp
{
−
∫ t+Δ
t
hsds
}
(G.2)
Finally, the expected duration of price spells is given by E{T} = ∫ +∞
0
tdFt. Integrating by parts
and using that STt = 1−Ft, we obtain:
E{T} =
∫ +∞
0
STt dt (G.3)
Instantaneous Hazard Rate Let Tn(z, ϕ) denote the duration of price spells of firm (nt, zt) =
(n, z) in aggregate state ϕ ∈ Φ. Conditional on survival, the probability of a price change during the
interval [t, t+Δ], given that the price spell was still ongoing at date t, is:
Pr
[
t < Tn(z, ϕ) ≤ t+Δ
∣∣∣Tn(z, ϕ) > t] = [η(θn+1,t+Δ(z, ϕ))Δ+ o(Δ)]+ n[δcΔ+ o(Δ)]
+
∑
z˜ =z
[
λz(z˜|z)Δ + o(Δ)
]
+
∑
ϕ˜ =ϕ
[
λϕ(ϕ˜|ϕ)Δ + o(Δ)
]
where o(Δ) collects higher-order terms. The instantaneous hazard rate (as defined in (G.1)) is:
hn(z, ϕ) = η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)
+ nδc +
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z) +
∑
ϕ˜ =ϕ
λϕ(ϕ˜|ϕ)
Note the absence of time subscripts in the above expression. This is a convenient implication of
our block-recursive structure. Two relevant implications of this result follow:
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• The firm-level cumulative hazard is linear in time (though non-linear in the aggregate state):
Hn,t(z, ϕ) = hn(z, ϕ)t (G.4)
The survival function, in turn, takes the simple form STn,t(z, ϕ) = exp
{− hn(z, ϕ)t}.
• The cross-sectional average hazard of price changes is:
Ht(ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
gn,t(z)hn(z, ϕ)
where gn(z) = Sn,t(z)
/∑
n,z Sn,t(z) is the firm-size probability mass function (p.m.f.).
Frequency of Price Changes We define the frequency of price changes over a time window of
length one (i.e. 1/Δ sub-periods) as the cumulative probability of a price change after a spell of such
length. Using equations (G.2) and (G.4)), this probability is:
fn(z, ϕ) = 1− exp
{
− hn(z, ϕ)
}
(G.5)
Therefore, the frequency of price changes at the firm-level is a jump variable. The average fre-
quency of price adjustment in the cross-section of firms is:
Ft(ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
gn,t(z)fn(z, ϕ)
Hence, the aggregate frequency of price changes evolves over time according to the underlying
distribution dynamics.
Expected Duration of Price Spells From equation (G.4), the price duration Tn(z, ϕ) follows
an exponential distribution with parameter hn(z, ϕ). The average duration (equation (G.3)) is then
simply the reciprocal of the instantaneous hazard. Expressed in terms of frequency, this means:
E
{
Tn(z, ϕ)
}
= − 1
log
(
1− fn(z, ϕ)
) (G.6)
Then:
Dt(ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
gn,t(z)
hn(z, ϕ)
is the average expected duration of prices at time t.
Moments of the Distribution of Price Changes Finally, we report moments of the distri-
bution of (non-zero) price log-changes.
• The expected absolute price change in market (n, z) is defined as the average log change in prices.
Denoting p̂ ≡ log p, we have:
μΔn (z, ϕ) = η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)∣∣∣p̂n+1(z, ϕ)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣+ nδc∣∣∣p̂n(z, ϕ)− p̂n−1(z, ϕ)∣∣∣
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)
∣∣∣p̂n(z˜, ϕ)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣+ ∑
ϕ˜ =ϕ
λϕ(ϕ˜|ϕ)
∣∣∣p̂n(z, ϕ˜)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣
where
∣∣.∣∣ denotes the absolute value.
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• The variance of the distribution of price changes is given by:
σΔn (z, ϕ) = η
(
θn+1(z, ϕ)
)(∣∣∣p̂n+1(z, ϕ)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣− μΔn (z, ϕ))2 + nδc(∣∣∣p̂n(z, ϕ)− p̂n−1(z, ϕ)∣∣∣− μΔn (z, ϕ))2
+
∑
z˜ =z
λz(z˜|z)
(∣∣∣p̂n(z˜, ϕ)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣− μΔn (z, ϕ))2 + ∑
ϕ˜ =ϕ
λϕ(ϕ˜|ϕ)
(∣∣∣p̂n(z, ϕ˜)− p̂n(z, ϕ)∣∣∣− μΔn (z, ϕ))2
where σΔn (z, ϕ) denotes the variance of price changes.
At the population level, these moments cannot be aggregated using g (the unconditional firm
distribution), for not all firms change prices every period. Instead, we use the so-called renewal
distribution of firms, that is, the distribution of firms conditional on a price adjustment:
rn,t(z, ϕ) ≡ gn,t(z)fn(z, ϕ)∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
gn,t(z)fn(z, ϕ)
Then, the average expected size and the average standard deviation of price changes are:
MΔt (ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
rn,t(z, ϕ)μ
Δ
n (z, ϕ) and Σ
Δ
t (ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈N
∑
z∈Z
rn,t(z, ϕ)
√
σΔn (z, ϕ)
respectively.
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